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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Great is truth, but still greater, from a practical point of view,
is silence about truth.”1 The shrewd observations of Brave New
World author Aldous Huxley ring ever true today. Huxley

1. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD xv (Chatto & Windus 1946).
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recognized that the greatest triumphs of propaganda have been
achieved not by a carefully crafted message or infectious slogan but
by silence: active concealment of the facts that political bosses deem
undesirable.2 And so, we relish in a state of artificial bliss, made
possible by deliberately inflicted ignorance.
In this age of politics dominated by corporate special interests,
ignorance-perpetuating laws are injected into our statutory codes
while whistleblowing activity is criminalized and truth-speakers
are sued into silence.3 As a result, our food safety becomes
compromised.4 Sentient creatures confined in the name of animal
husbandry are subjected to ever-devolving conditions while their
captors’ profits soar.5 Factory walls become more opaque.6 Concern
for the public interest falls into obsolescence.7
No legislative trend better illustrates this alarming decline
than so-called “ag-gag” laws.8 The term refers to legislation passed
at the behest of the animal agriculture (“ag”) industry in an attempt
2. Id.
3. This Comment focuses on one particular variety of such ignoranceperpetuating laws, colloquially referred to as “ag-gag” (short for “agricultural
gag”) laws. See generally infra notes 69–107 and accompanying text (describing
the purpose, history, and varieties of ag-gag laws). These laws represent efforts
to outlaw the type of investigative activities that lead to damning exposés of
animal agriculture operations. Id.
4. See, e.g., infra notes 44, 63, 226–228 and accompanying text (providing
examples of severe ongoing food-safety violations in various industries, brought
to light only by private whistleblowers).
5. See, e.g., John J. McGlone, Alternative Sow Housing Systems: Driven by
Legislation, Regulation, Free Trade and Free Market Systems (but Not Science),
PORK INDUS. INST., TEX. TECH. UNIV. 1 (Jan. 2001), www.depts.ttu.edu/animal
welfare/research/sowhousing/documents/SowhousingManitoba.pdf
(paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Manitoba Pork Producers, Winnipeg,
Manitoba, Canada). McGlone explained that the pork industry’s preference for
housing breeding sows in hyper-confinement systems is the direct result of
economic pressures favoring increased efficiency and decreased animal welfare.
Id.; P.L. van Horne, Production and Economic Results of Commercial Flocks
with White Layers in Aviary Systems and Battery Cages, 37 BRITISH POULTRY
SCIENCE 225 (1996) (reporting greater economic efficiency of battery-cage
housing systems for egg-laying hens despite higher mortality rate).
6. See First Amended Complaint at 1, People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals v. Cooper, No. 16-cv-25 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2016) (characterizing laws
designed to deter employee whistleblowing as “Anti-Sunshine” laws due to their
effect of reducing workplace transparency, particularly in factory farms).
7. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPECTIVES ON
POLITICS 564, 564 (2014) (reporting that economic elites and business-interest
groups have a substantial impact on U.S. government policy, while average
citizens and public interest groups have little to none).
8. Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/
(coining the term “ag-gag” and describing the laws’ effect); see also infra Part
II–B–2 (describing in more detail the purpose, history, and effect of ag-gag
legislation).
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to silence (“gag”) whistleblowers who observe illegal or abusive
practices.9 Ag-gag laws accomplish their industry-protective effect
by making it illegal to photograph, record video, or otherwise
conduct an investigation at a factory farm or slaughterhouse.10
This Comment explores the history and purpose of ag-gag
legislation as well as its constitutional shortcomings, particularly
with regard to damages. Using North Carolina’s recent ag-gag
efforts to silence whistleblowers as an effective case study, this
Comment explains how free-speech protections, public policy, and
causation principles all limit the monetary damages recoverable
against undercover investigators. It begins in Part II with a history
of undercover investigations and their role in confronting systemic
exploitation within various industries. It then describes how these
industries have responded to the unwanted attention by turning to
the courts and legislatures for redress. It is in this section that aggag legislation is introduced and described in greater detail. Part
III begins by examining common-law limitations on tort liability,
particularly in cases concerning breach of employee duty of loyalty.
It describes how these legal and practical limitations have driven
ag-industry lobbyists to seek legislative favors to more effectively
deter undercover investigations. The Comment then describes how
their statutory solution (ag-gag laws) are effectively emasculated by
First Amendment free-speech protections. Part III concludes with a
brief look at another liability-limiting concept, known as “proximate
causation,” which applies principles of policy and logic to shield
investigators from monetary damages sustained by exposed
industries.
In Part IV, I call upon litigators and lawmakers to tackle the
unconstitutional civil-damage provisions found in roughly half of
the ag-gag statutes currently in effect, and caution other states
against enactment of such provisions. I implore courts tasked with
applying these laws to respect the constitutional protections and
public-policy considerations limiting the amount of damages they
may award. I then point out some practical reasons why a company
that finds itself the target of an exposé should refrain from suing
the undercover investigator who infiltrated them. Finally, I
encourage activist groups to continue in their constitutionally
protected efforts to expose abuse and wrongdoing in the animal
agriculture industry. Part V concludes this Comment.

9. Id.
10. Id.; see generally infra notes 89–107, 121 and accompanying text
(describing in detail the various types of ag-gag laws that exist and the specific
types of conduct they prohibit).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Undercover Investigations of Animal Industries
Undercover investigations are “the only meaningful way” for
American consumers to find out how animals are treated in today’s
agriculture and entertainment industries. 11 It is the only available
window into our nation’s research laboratories or the multi-billiondollar pet trade.12 Investigations tell a far different story than the
pre-arranged, perfunctory “inspections” by regulatory agencies.13
Undercover investigations reveal institutionalized cruelty to
animals and serve as an indispensable method of evidencegathering for civil litigation and the prosecution of abuse. 14 Perhaps
most importantly, these investigations help consumers make more
informed choices—from entertainment to food.15 Given all that
11. Debate: After Activists Covertly Expose Animal Cruelty, Should They Be
Targeted With “Ag-Gag” Laws?, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Apr. 9, 2013),
www.democracynow.org/2013/4/9/debate_after_activists_covertly_expose_anim
al [hereinafter Ag-Gage Debate] (quoting independent journalist Will Potter);
see also The Captive Animals Protection Society, SAVE A SCREAM, www.saveascr
eam.com/caps.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2017) (calling undercover
investigations “the only way of obtaining evidence” of animal abuse in the circus
trade); Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the
First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1468 (2015) (explaining “there is no
viable alternative to an undercover investigation of the commercial agricultural
industry.”).
12. See, e.g., Lisa Fletcher & Arash Ghadishah, Exclusive: Ex-Employees
Claim ‘Horrific’ Treatment of Primates at Lab, ABC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2009), www
.abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=6997869 (describing results of undercover
investigation at New Iberia Research Center and conveying sentiment that
going undercover is “the only way” to get the truth); Allen St. John, Where *Not*
to Buy a Dog: The Pet Store Connection to the Business of Puppy Mills, FORBES
(Feb. 22, 2012, 12:10 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/allenstjohn/2012/02/22/wherenot-to-buy-a-dog-the-pet-store-connection-to-the-business-of-puppy-mills/
(interviewing Andrew Nibley, creator of HBO documentary exposing connection
between the pet retail industry and puppy mills).
13. Undercover Investigations, CITIZENS FOR ALTERNATIVES TO ANIMAL
RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION, www.caareusa.org/undercover_investigatio
ns (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
14. Steve Wells, Executive Director, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Address
at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, ALDF Meet & Greet (Sept.
21, 2015); Behind Closed Doors: Going Undercover to Expose Animal Abuse,
SATYA MAGAZINE (Aug. 2003), www.satyamag.com/aug03/rossell.html
(explaining, “Without undercover investigations, it often comes down to a ‘he
said, she said’ situation; but video doesn’t lie. Of course, the animal industries
try to deny it anyway, but when shown the evidence, the public can see right
through their false claims.”).
15. Justin Marceau, Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law,
ALDF Meet & Greet Cocktail Hour (Sept. 21, 2015); see also Jennifer Molidor,
Undercover Investigations Help Protect Farmed Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL
DEFENSE FUND (Mar. 31, 2015), http://aldf.org/blog/undercover-investigationshelp-protect-farmed-animals/ (explaining that these investigations “are central
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undercover investigations can accomplish, it is easy to see why
those who profit from animal exploitation would push to outlaw
such truth-seeking tactics.
1. History of Investigations
Undercover investigations have a long and storied history in
American news journalism, particularly when it has come to
exposing institutionalized abuses, corporate wrongdoing, and the
exploitation of vulnerable populations. 16 One of the first undercover
investigations into the American food-production industry is also
the most iconic: Celebrated muckraker Upton Sinclair disguised
himself as a worker to gain access to the Chicago meatpacking
industry.17 While undercover, Sinclair wandered about the
stockyards, documenting what he saw.18 His investigation
ultimately served as the source and inspiration for the acclaimed
1906 novel The Jungle.19 Like the undercover work of modern-day
animal rights and labor activists, Sinclair’s work was critical to
exposing the unsavory practices of a powerful industry to public
scrutiny.20
One of the earliest undercover investigations conducted by an
animal-rights group took place in 1981, when PETA activists
exposed the suffering of laboratory monkeys at a Maryland research
facility.21 Since these first undercover stings by animal activists in

to building cases against animal abusers and those who profit from the
exploitation of animals.”).
16. Brooke Kroeger, Journalists Go Undercover to Report on Slavery,
SCHUSTER INSTITUTE FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, www.schusterinstitute
investigations.org/undercover-reporting-on-slaver (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
Even before the animal-protection and food-safety movements gained steam,
undercover newsgathering tactics were being used by American abolitionists in
the mid-1800s, who traveled to states like Georgia and Louisiana posing as
slave buyers in order to document the treatment and conditions of enslaved
Black persons. Id. One such journalist, Mortimer Thomson, used his stealth
position as a slave buyer to interview both slaves and slave owners at a large
auction in Savannah, Georgia, taking notes undetected on the inside pages of a
slave sale catalogue, all without raising any suspicion. Id. His documentation
was published regularly in the New York Tribune and provided the substance
for his 1863 book What Became of the Slaves? Id.
17. WILLIAM A. BLOODWORTH, JR., UPTON SINCLAIR 45–48 (1977).
18. Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the
First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1457 (2015) (citing UPTON SINCLAIR,
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF UPTON SINCLAIR 109 (1962), and ANTHONY ARTHUR,
RADICAL INNOCENT: UPTON SINCLAIR 49 (2006)).
19. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
20. Chen & Marceau, supra note 18, at 1457.
21. PETA’s Milestones, PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS
(PETA), www.peta.org/about-peta/milestones/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).

654

The John Marshall Law Review

[50:649

the 1980s, the targets of investigations have expanded to include
slaughterhouses,22 factory farms,23 laboratories,24 roadside zoos,25

22. See, e.g., ALDF Investigation Exposes Tyson Cruelty, ANIMAL LEGAL
DEFENSE FUND, http://web.archive.org/web/20150918102439/http://aldf.org:80/
about-us/programs/undercover-investigations-program/tyson-cruelty/
(last
visited Aug. 27, 2017) (exposing animal abuse and worker-safety violations at
Tyson chicken slaughterhouse); Abused Calves at Vermont Slaughter Plant,
HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Oct. 30, 2009), www.humanesociety.org/news/news
/2009/10/calf_investigation_103009.html (documenting workers kicking,
slapping, and repeatedly shocking day-old dairy calves at veal-industry
slaughterhouse); PETA Reveals Extreme Cruelty at Kosher Slaughterhouses,
PETA, www.peta.org/features/agriprocessors/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017)
(uncovering violations of federal humane slaughter laws and Jewish religious
law at “the world’s largest glatt kosher slaughterhouse”); Butterball’s House of
Horrors: A PETA Undercover Investigation, PETA, www.peta.org/features/but
terball-peta-investigation/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017) (exposing extreme abuse
suffered by turkeys at Arkansas slaughter plant).
23. See, e.g., Calif. Police Probe Foster Farms After Video Shows Apparent
Animal Cruelty, CBS NEWS (June 17, 2015, 9:46 AM), www.cbsnews.com/news/
foster-farms-investigated-by-california-police-after-undercover-video-shows-ap
parent-animal-cruelty/ (describing Mercy For Animals’ undercover
investigation at major poultry producer); Undercover Exposé: Inhumane
Treatment of Animals, Food Safety Concerns at Costco Egg Supplier, HUMANE
SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (June 9, 2015), www.humanesociety.org/news/press_releas
es/2015/06/inhumane-treatment-costco-egg-supplier-060915.html
(revealing
deplorable conditions of hens at Costco egg supplier); Mike Hughlett, Video Shot
in Minn. Spotlights How Pigs Are Treated, STAR TRIBUNE (July 18, 2012, 11:52
AM), www.startribune.com/video-shot-in-minn-spotlights-how-pigs-are-treated
/162790086/ (documenting extreme confinement of pregnant sows at hog
producer’s factory farm); Buried Alive: COK Investigation Uncovers Shocking
Cruelty to Chickens at NC Factory Farm, COMPASSION OVER KILLING,
http://cok.net/inv/pilgrims/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017) (documenting workers
callously mishandling sick and injured birds); Hudson Valley Foie Gras Factory
Farm Investigation, COMPASSION OVER KILLING, http://cok.net/inv/hudson-va
lley/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017) (detailing treatment of ducks at major foie gras
producer).
24. See, e.g., Undercover Investigation Reveals Dogs Suffering in Dental
Experimentation, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Nov. 30, 2013), www.humanesoc
iety.org/news/press_releases/2013/11/georgia-regents-university-dogs112013.html (revealing the killing of dogs in unnecessary dental-implant
experiments at Georgia Regents University); Columbia University Cruelty,
PETA, www.peta.org/features/columbia-university-cruelty-deadly-animal-expe
rimentation/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017) (uncovering “crude experiments” and
neglect inflicted upon monkeys and baboons in research laboratory).
25. See, e.g., Undercover Investigations Reveal Abuse of Tiger Cubs at
Roadside Zoos, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Jan. 22, 2015), www.humaneso
ciety.org/news/press_releases/2015/01/ok-va-exotics-investigation-012215.html
.
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livestock auctions,26 animal training facilities,27 pet suppliers,28
livestock transport,29 and numerous others.30
Activists utilize a variety of methods to investigate
institutionalized animal exploitation. 31 The particular method best
suited for a particular case will depend on the nature of the target
and where it is located.32 Tactics vary from paying admission, to

26. See, e.g., Gillian Flaccus, Ontario Livestock Sales Workers Allegedly
Mistreat Animals in Undercover Video, HUFFINGTON POST (July 30, 2012, 5:12
AM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/30/ontario-livestock-sales_n_154884.ht
ml. (depicting workers “kicking, hitting and tossing” animals as they were
readied for sale at California livestock auction); PETA Undercover
Investigation: Juvenile Racehorses Forced to Run in Deadly Speed Tests, PETA,
www.peta.org/action/action-alerts/undercover-investigation-juvenile-racehorse
s-forced-to-run-in-deadly-speed-tests/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017) (documenting
“catastrophic breakdowns” and “life-ending” injuries sustained by yearlings at
horse auction).
27. See, e.g., Detailed Undercover Investigation Reveals Tennessee Walking
Horse Abuse at Top Training Barn, with Big-Name, Previously Cited Trainers
Continuing Their Illegal Conduct, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Aug. 25, 2015),
www.humanesociety.org/news/press_releases/2015/08/tn-walking-horseinvestigation-082515.html (documenting use of caustic chemicals on horses’
lower legs, causing them “extreme pain” in order to achieve the exaggerated gait
considered desirable at showcase events); Christina Boyle, PETA Video Shows
Ringling Bros. Circus Handlers Beating Elephants, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 22,
2009, 12:37 AM), www.nydailynews.com/news/peta-video-shows-ringling-broscircus-handlers-beating-elephants-article-1.169174 (documenting “routine” use
of bullhooks and whips on elephants backstage).
28. See, e.g., Puppy Mill Prison, PETA, www.peta.org/features/puppy-millprison/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017) (revealing untreated wounds, inadequate
shelter, and evidence of psychological trauma at commercial dog breeding
operation); Undercover at National Retailers’ Frog and Miniature-Aquarium
Supplier, PETA, www.peta.org/videos/undercover-at-national-retailers-frog-an
d-miniature-aquarium-supplier/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017) (exposing “rampant
neglect and mishandling of frogs” at Wild Creations, the supplier for
Brookstone’s Frog-O-Spheres).
29. See, e.g., 36 Hours to Hell, PETA, www.peta.org/videos/36-hours-to-hell/
(last visited Aug. 21, 2017) (publishing undercover video taken aboard truck
transporting unwanted horses to slaughter).
30. See, e.g., New Undercover Investigation Reveals Tame and Drugged
Animals Shot for Trophies at Captive Hunts, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (June
21,
2011),
www.humanesociety.org/news/press_releases/2011/06/captive_
hunt_undercover_investigation_animal_planet_062111.html
(describing
investigations of captive-hunting ranches in Texas and New York);
Investigation Exposes Pigeon-Racing Cruelty, PETA, www.peta.org/features/
pigeon-racing-investigation/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017) (exposing “rampant
killing” and “abusive training methods” in “multimillion-dollar illegal gambling
industry”).
31. Interview with TJ Tumasse, Manager of Investigations, Animal Legal
Defense Fund, in Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 4, 2015) (on file with author).
32. Id. Aside from ag-gag laws, investigators must also be conscious of state
laws related to trespass, invasion of privacy, eavesdropping, etc. Id. Variations
in these laws from state to state dictate which investigative methods are on or
off the table for a particular case. Id.
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gaining employment, to using new technologies like drones. 33 But
no matter the particular strategy employed, all investigations
involve some kind of recording device.34 Sometimes the camera is
small and hidden, as in undercover scenarios, and sometimes it is
blatantly obvious, mounted to a noisy drone, or strung around the
investigator’s neck.35 But when it comes to exposing patterns of
abuse in private industries, the employment-based undercover
investigation is the go-to method.36
Investigators working undercover as employees often have to
get creative to conceal their recording devices in a way that still
allows them to perform their agricultural duties. 37 These
investigators are not there to lurk in the shadows; they have to
actually do the job they’re hired to do, whether it is live-hanging
chickens for slaughter, castrating piglets on a hog farm, cleaning
cages at a research laboratory, or any other task assigned by their
employer.38 That is the only way to fly under the radar.39
The exposed industry often tries to claim that the video only
shows the “worst of the worst” and is not an accurate representation
of the industry’s practices.40 Yet, according to one former
undercover investigator, quite the opposite is true: “At these
facilities, you see more cruelty than you can ever document. There’s
no need to string together bits of pieces of footage to fabricate a
narrative of abuse. It’s right there, before your eyes, at every
turn.”41

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. “It doesn’t matter what type of facility it is or what the security
measures are; we are smart enough to hide a camera and get it into that place.
We are more creative, more educated, and more adaptable than anybody who’s
trying to stop us.” Id.
38. Id. And that, according to Tumasse, is the hardest part: “When working
undercover, you’re often taking part in the confinement and torture of the very
beings you’re trying to protect. That’s what makes undercover investigations so
emotionally difficult.” Id.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Ag-Gag Debate, supra note 11 (quoting Emily Meredith,
communications director for the Animal Agriculture Alliance, who claims
animal activists are “mistreating” video and splicing together old footage to
create “a false narrative.”); Behind Closed Doors, supra note 14 (quoting former
undercover investigator Matt Rossell, explaining, “[T]he animal industries try
to deny it . . . but when shown the evidence, the public can see right through
their false claims.”).
41. Interview with TJ Tumasse, supra note 31.
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2. Outcomes of Investigations
At the end of the day, undercover investigations are effective.42
Evidence obtained from these investigations has led to criminal
convictions,43 massive food recalls,44 lawsuits,45 stronger animalprotection laws,46 and even changes in corporate policy.47
Undercover exposés have even had a measurable impact on
consumers’ buying habits.48 A study published by the Kansas State
42. The HSUS: Driving Transformational Change for Animals Since 1954:
Exposing Animal Cruelty Through Undercover Investigations, HUMANE SOC’Y
OF THE U.S., www.humanesociety.org/about/hsus-transformational-change.ht
ml (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
43. See, e.g., Complaint at 22, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert, No.
2:13-cv-00679-RJS (D. Utah July 22, 2013) (presenting litany of animal-cruelty
convictions founded on evidence obtained during undercover investigations by
animal-rights groups); see also Investigation of North Carolina Pig Farm
Results in Historic Felony Cruelty Convictions, PETA (Apr. 2000), www.peta.or
g/about-peta/victories/investigation-north-carolina-pig-farm-results-historic-fel
ony-cruelty-convictions/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017) (announcing first-ever
felony convictions for cruelty to livestock after undercover video revealed hogfarm workers beating pregnant sows with a wrench and iron pole, skinning pigs
alive, and even sawing off a conscious animal’s limbs).
44. See, e.g., Andrew Martin, Largest Recall of Ground Beef Is Ordered, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2008), www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/business/18recall.html
(reporting on largest beef recall in history—143 million pounds of beef produced
by Hallmark/Westland Meat Company, following an undercover investigation
by the Humane Society of the United States that revealed workers on forklifts
forcing “downer” cows into slaughter, a severe violation of food safety laws); see
also Dan Flynn, Iowa Approves Nation’s First ‘Ag-Gag’ Law, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS (Mar. 1, 2012), www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/03/iowa-approves-nations
-first-ag-gag-law (noting that California meat processors Hallmark/Westland
were forced out of business following HSUS’s undercover sting).
45. See, e.g., HSUS Lawsuit Against Hallmark/Westland Moves Forward,
DAIRY HERD MGMT. (Jan. 17, 2011, 1:07 PM), www.dairyherd.com/dairy-new
s/latest/hsus-lawsuit-against-hallmarkwestland-moves-forward-11397810
9.html (announcing U.S. Dept. of Justice’s intent to intervene in civil lawsuit
against Hallmark/Westland for violations of the False Claims Act).
46. See, e.g., Utah Ends Mandatory Pound Seizure Following PETA’s
Investigation, PETA (Jan. 2010), www.peta.org/about-peta/victories/utah-endsmandatory-pound-seizure-following-petas-investigation/ (last visited Aug. 21,
2017) (announcing passage of Utah legislation to end the compelled sale of
homeless dogs and cats from government-run shelters to laboratories for use in
experiments).
47. See, e.g., Matt Rice, Progress: Walmart Announces Sweeping Animal
Welfare Policy, MFA BLOG (May 22, 2015), www.mfablog.org/progress-walmartannounces-sweeping-animal (announcing Walmart’s stated commitment to
improving farmed animal welfare across its entire global supply chain following
a string of undercover investigations revealing egregious abuse among its pork
suppliers); MasterCard Cancels Controversial Sponsorship of Ringling Bros.
and Barnum & Bailey Circus, PETA (Jan. 2004), www.peta.org/about-peta/vict
ories/mastercard-cancels-controversial-sponsorship-ringling-bros-barnum-bail
ey-circus/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
48. Glynn T. Tonsor and Nicole J. Olynk, U.S. Meat Demand: The Influence
of Animal Welfare Media Coverage, KAN. ST. UNIV. (Sept. 2010), www.agmana
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University Department of Agricultural Economics concluded that
“media attention to animal welfare has significant, negative effects
on U.S. meat demand.”49 It is not surprising, then, that the animalagriculture industry has chosen to take aim at these undercover
investigations in an attempt to confound their effect.

B. Industry Response to Investigations
Since the 1990s, industry players have turned to both litigation
and legislation in search of redress for the harms allegedly befallen
them at the hands of undercover activists. 50 To those contemplating
litigation however, it quickly became apparent that traditional laws
could not provide the industry with the vindication it sought. 51 So
the meat, dairy, and egg lobbies 52 got to work in state legislatures
encouraging lawmakers to enact the types of laws the industry had
previously lacked use of in court. 53 And thus, “ag-gag” laws were
born: legislation specifically designed to stop undercover
investigators from documenting abuse at animal agricultural
operations.54

ger.info/livestock/marketing/animalwelfare/MF2951.pdf.
49. Id.
50. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion II), 194 F.3d 505
(4th Cir. 1999) (bringing claims for fraud, trespass, and breach of employee duty
of loyalty); Desnick v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995)
(alleging trespass, infringement of right of privacy, illegal wiretapping, and
promissory fraud); see also infra Part II–B–2 (describing legislative efforts).
51. See Food Lion II, 194 F.3d at 524 (awarding plaintiff only nominal
damages for breach of duty of loyalty and trespass where defendants did not
cause any actual harm).
52. In 2014, the meat, dairy, egg, and livestock industries spent a combined
total of $20.6 million lobbying Congress. Dairy, OPEN SECRETS, www.opensecr
ets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2016&ind=A04 (last visited Jan. 26, 2018)
($3.5 millon); Livestock, OPEN SECRETS, www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.
php?cycle=2016&ind=A06 (last visited Jan. 26, 2018) ($9 million); Meat
Processing & Products, OPEN SECRETS, www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals
.php?ind=G2300 (last visited Jan. 26, 2018) ($1.8 million); Poultry & Eggs,
OPEN SECRETS, www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?ind=A05++ (last
visited Jan. 26, 2018) ($6.3 million). By comparison, vegetable, fruit, and nut
producers spent a total of just $2.3 million. Vegetables & Fruits, OPEN SECRETS,
www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?ind=A1400 (last visited Jan. 26,
2018).
53. See infra note 70 and accompanying text (describing ALEC origins of
legislative model).
54. See generally infra notes 69–107 and accompanying text.
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This section will provide an overview of the animal-agriculture
industry’s litigation and legislative efforts over the past two
decades, focusing particularly on one state—North Carolina—in
whose courtrooms and legislative chambers the food industry has
raged a long and storied battle against undercover investigators.
The particularly active battleground in that state makes for a rich
case study, with lessons applicable in all fifty states.
1. Litigation
The first case to examine the availability of legal remedies to
the target of an employment-based undercover investigation was
brought in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina in the mid-1990s (Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc.).55 The court was tasked with applying North Carolina law
against an undercover reporter who surreptitiously filmed behind
the scenes at a Food Lion grocery store while working as a meat
wrapper.56 Food Lion was litigated for the better part of a decade
and remains one of the foremost cases on questions of First
Amendment protections for those who expose damning truths about
powerful industries.57
In 1992, a report came across the desk of ABC’s PrimeTime
Live news program alleging various unsanitary meat-handling
practices taking place at Food Lion grocery stores.58 The two ABC
reporters assigned to investigate the story determined they would
have a better chance of witnessing the unsanitary meat practices if
they became Food Lion employees themselves.59 So, with the
approval of their superiors at the network, the reporters applied for
jobs with the grocery chain using false identities, fake references,
and fictitious local addresses on their employment applications. 60
To further avoid raising suspicion, the reporters misrepresented
their educational backgrounds and omitted any mention of their
concurrent employment with ABC. 61 Using this tactic, the reporters
secured deli jobs at separate Food Lion stores, including one in
North Carolina.62 As they went about their assigned deli tasks for
Food Lion, the reporters concealed cameras and microphones on
55. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion I), 964 F. Supp.
956 (M.D.N.C. 1997), aff’d on other grounds, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
56. Food Lion II, 194 F.3d at 510.
57. See, e.g., Chen & Marceau, supra note 18, at 1498 (calling Food Lion the
“leading circuit court decision” illustrating the point that “a lie that enables a
journalist to obtain paid employment and thus causes the employer to
experience [financial injury] is not a legally cognizable harm.”).
58. Food Lion II, 194 F.3d at 510.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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their bodies to secretly record Food Lion employees mishandling
and mislabeling meat and fish.63 Some of the footage was eventually
used in a PrimeTime Live broadcast.64
Shortly after the exposé aired, Food Lion filed suit against the
two reporters who went undercover for the program.65 It asserted
claims of fraud, breach of employee duty of loyalty, trespass, and
unfair trade practices, seeking millions in compensatory damages.66
Despite ultimately winning on its duty of loyalty and trespass
claims against the reporters, Food Lion walked away with a total
award of two dollars.67 A classic example of “sometimes when you
win, you really lose.”68
Given the striking triviality of this award (and considering
what they must have spent on attorneys’ fees and court costs), Food
Lion did not come out ahead at all. As the grocery chain learned,
the common law simply does not offer much redress for the types of
injury most devastating to targets of undercover investigations:
harm to reputation. To cure this deficiency, industry lobbyists have
been busy doing their part in the state legislatures.
2. Legislation: “Ag-Gag” Laws
The term “ag-gag” was coined by New York Times columnist
Mark Bittman to describe legislative efforts to outlaw, or at least
stymie, undercover investigations of agricultural operations. 69
These laws are based on model legislation originally drafted in 2004
by the conservative American Legislative Exchange Council
(ALEC).70 At the behest of agribusiness groups, lawmakers have
63. Id.
64. Id. at 511.
65. Id. In addition to the two reporters, Food Lion also named as defendants
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., and two
PrimeTime Live producers. Id.
66. Id. See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool, 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)
(explaining compensatory damages are intended to redress concrete losses a
plaintiff has suffered as a result of defendant’s wrongful conduct);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 906 (1979) (disallowing compensatory
damages for alleged harm to a plaintiff’s earning potential without sufficient
proof of pecuniary loss).
67. Food Lion II, 194 F.3d at 524. The court determined Food Lion had
sustained no injury for which it could be compensated. Id. at 523–24. Thus, the
only available “remedy” was $2 in nominal damages. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 (1979) (defining nominal damages).
68. WHITE MEN CAN’T JUMP (20th Century Fox 1992).
69. Bittman, supra note 8.
70. THE ANIMAL AND ECOLOGICAL TERRORISM ACT (AETA) § 3(A)(2) (2004),
www.alec.org/model-legislation/the-animal-and-ecological-terrorism-act-aeta/;
Deron Lee, “Ag-Gag” Reflex, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. (Aug. 6, 2013), www
.cjr.org/united_states_project/state_legislatures_are_pushing_ag-gag_bills_and
_news_associations_are_fighting_back.php; Will Potter, “Ag Gag” Bills and
Supporters Have Close Ties to ALEC, GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Apr. 26, 2012),

2017]

Principles Limiting Recovery Against Undercover Investigators

661

introduced several varieties of these laws in state legislatures
across the country.71 To date, ag-gag legislation has been introduced
in over twenty states and passed in nine.72
a. Purpose
The
success
of
recent
undercover
whistleblowing
investigations provided the impetus for the current ag-gag trend.73
After PETA released a video in 2008 depicting Iowa farmworkers
using brutal methods to kill pigs, agriculture lobbyists nationwide
began advocating for legislation to criminalize undercover reporting
on animal-agriculture operations.74 The result was Iowa House File
589, which established the crime of “agricultural production facility
www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/ag-gag-american-legislative-exchange-counci
l/5947/ (“Ag Gag bills parallel other national efforts by ALEC, such as ‘Stand
Your Ground’ legislation, in that they have been promulgated through model
legislation, carefully coordinated task forces, and the ability to mobilize ALEC
members for key votes.”); see also Leighton Akio Woodhouse, Charged with the
Crime of Filming a Slaughterhouse, THE NATION (July 31, 2013),
www.thenation.com/article/charged-crime-filming-slaughterhouse/ (describing
ALEC’s model bill, the Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act, which proposed
criminalizing activities such as “entering an animal or research facility to take
pictures by photograph, video camera, or other means.”).
71. Lee, supra note 70.
72. See Mark Middleton, Ag-Gag Laws and Factory Farm Investigations
Mapped, ANIMAL VISUALS (last updated Aug. 9, 2015), www.animalvisuals.org/
projects/data/investigations (mapping undercover investigations and the
progress of ag-gag laws in the U.S. since 2011). The nine ag-gag laws that have
been passed to date are codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1825 to 47-1828
(2017) (Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protection
Act); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-21.1-01 to 12.1-21.1-05 (2017) (North Dakota
“Animal Research Facility Damage” statute); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 81-30-101
to 81-30-105 (2017) (Montana Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection
Act); IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2017) (establishing crime of “agricultural
production facility fraud.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (LexisNexis 2017)
(establishing crime of “agricultural operation interference”), held
unconstitutional by Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d
1193 (D. Utah 2017); IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2014) (establishing crime of
“interference with agricultural production.”), held unconstitutional in part by
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905 (9th
Cir. Jan. 4, 2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 578.013 (2017) (establishing duty to submit
video or other digital recording of suspected animal abuse to law enforcement
within twenty-four hours of making the recording); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2
(2015) (North Carolina Property Protection Act); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113
(2017).
73. Justin F. Marceau, Ag Gag Past, Present, and Future, 38 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1317, 1344 (2015) (commenting on state legislatures’ defensive reactions
to “shocking exposés,” some of which have led to massive food recalls).
74. Justin Worland, An Undercover Investigation Alleges Major
Mistreatment of Egg-Laying Hens, TIME MAGAZINE (June 9, 2015), http://time.c
om/3914696/cage-free-chicken-investigation/ (harking back to the industry’s
response to the national outcry that stemmed from PETA’s undercover exposé
of an Iowa pig farm).
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fraud.”75 Backers of the Iowa bill included large-scale farming
interests such as the Iowa Poultry Association, who claimed that
their industry “need[ed] to be protected from ‘fraud’ committed by
animal welfare groups.”76 In Idaho, the dairy industry responded in
kind after a 2012 undercover investigation at a local dairy farm
drew national attention and public scorn for the horrific abuses
revealed on tape.77 Idaho lawmakers subsequently sprung to
action—not to improve the treatment of dairy cows, but to
criminalize the conduct that exposed it. 78
Independent journalist Will Potter, one of ag-gag’s most
outspoken critics, refers to the legislation as “a concerted effort by
corporations to silence their opposition,” an effort “bankrolled by
some of the most powerful industries on the planet.” 79 The animalagriculture industry defends these laws under the rhetoric of
private property rights,80 responding to a need to protect their
businesses from “systematic attacks by terrorists”81 and to “keep
75. H.F. 589, 84th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2012) (codified at
IOWA CODE § 717A.3A).
76. Penny Tilton, SF 431, HF 589 Just Another Number or Letter to You?
Not for Animals, EXAMINER (Jan. 14, 2012, 11:55 PM), www.examiner.com/arti
cle/sf-431-hf-589-just-another-number-or-letter-to-you-not-for-animals.
77. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1199 (D.
Idaho 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018) (explaining the
events that led to the introduction and enactment of Idaho’s ag-gag law).
78. Id.
79. Ag-Gag Debate, supra note 11 (quoting ag-gag opponent and journalist
Will Potter).
80. See, e.g., Property Protection Act: Hearing on H.B. 405 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary II, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.B. 405] (statement of N.C. Rep. John Szoka,
Sponsor, Apr. 21, 2015) (purporting the need to “safeguard business property”);
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1208 (D. Utah
2017) (noting State’s contention that “private property rights extinguish . . .
First Amendment rights”); contra Marceau, supra note 73, at 1344 (explaining
that, contrary to industry pretext, ag-gag laws and related litigation “are about
insulating bad actors from whistleblowing and accountability for their bad acts”
and not about protecting property rights) (emphasis added).
81. Marceau, supra note 73, at 1344 (quoting Tony VanderHulst, president
of the Idaho Dairyman’s Association, describing the purpose of the proposed aggag bill). Justin Marceau, lead attorney for the plaintiffs in Otter, explained:
Not surprisingly, legislators who advocate for these new Ag Gag laws
strategically avoid discussing animal cruelty, food safety, sanitation, and
environmental problems and instead redirect the debate toward
protecting people whose livelihoods depend on the agriculture industry.
In fact, a substantial number of legislators who favor Ag Gag laws center
their arguments around the falsity of undercover videos and prey on the
common fears of families and small businesses of being misrepresented
and put out of work by extreme activists. In states like Idaho, where a
large portion of the population is involved in the agriculture industry,
these arguments proved convincing.
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evidence of the unflattering, and sometimes criminal, practices of
farms and slaughterhouses from public view.” 82 They are tired of
being “persecute[d] in the court of public opinion.” 83 Emily
Meredith, director of communications for Animal Agriculture
Alliance, explained that the “staunch opposition” the industry faces
from animal-rights activists makes these types of laws necessary. 84
“This is about exposing the real agenda of these radical groups that
are engaging in farm terrorism,” added Tony Vanderhulst,
president of the Idaho Dairymen’s Association.85 Comparing
animal-rights activists to “terrorists, persecutors, vigilantes,
blackmailers, and invading marauders,” ag-gag proponents view
undercover investigations as the greatest threat facing livestock
farmers today.86 One dairy industry lobbyist characterized
“extremist groups . . . masquerad[ing] as employees” as the “most
extreme” threat to Idaho dairymen and other farmers in the state. 87
The “overwhelming evidence gleaned from the legislative history”
of these laws makes clear their purpose is “to silence animal welfare
activists, or other whistleblowers, who seek to publish speech
critical of the animal agriculture industry.”88
b. Varieties of Ag-Gag Legislation
The first wave of ag-gag legislation focused primarily on
curbing intentional property damage and non-consensual entry (in
other words, vandalism and trespass—two activities that were
already criminal).89 Kansas became the first state to pass an ag-gag

Id. at 1336.
82. Matthew Shea, Punishing Animal Rights Activists for Animal Abuse:
Rapid Reporting and the New Wave of Ag-Gag Laws, 48 COLUM. J.L. SOC.
PROBS. 337, 338 (2015); see also Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1212 (noting that
Utah’s ag-gag law was expressly designed “to address harm caused by ‘national
propaganda groups,’ and by ‘the vegetarian people’”).
83. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1200 (D.
Idaho 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018) (describing
Idaho legislators’ given reasons for supporting the proposed ag-gag bill). One
representative described undercover investigators as “extreme activists who
want to contrive issues simply to bring in the donations,” while another
bemoaned activists “taking the dairy industry hostage.” Id.
84. Ag-Gag Debate, supra note 11.
85. See Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1201 (quoting a supporter of ag-gag
legislation who used the term “terrorists” to describe undercover activists).
86. See id. at 1200, 1210 (summarizing claims made by Idaho legislators in
support of the state’s 2012 ag-gag bill).
87. Id. at 1200.
88. Id. at 1210.
89. See Marceau, supra note 73, at 1332–39 (introducing the “ag gag law
era” and distinguishing ag-gag statutes from earlier legislative attempts to
deter whistleblowing by animal activists).
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law of this early variety,90 and Montana and North Dakota passed
similar laws the following year.91 To date, these three states’ laws
remain unused by prosecutors.92
Two decades after the enactment of these early-edition aggags, state legislatures decided to revisit the effort, marking the
beginning of the second wave of this controversial legislation. 93 The
result of this renewed effort has been the laws we typically think of
when we hear the term “ag-gag”: laws specifically enacted to
criminalize undercover investigations of animal factories in an
unabashed attempt to silence (i.e., “gag”) the industries’ critics. 94
These laws go further than their predecessors in protecting
agricultural operations by criminalizing a wider range of conduct—
conduct that has traditionally been protected under the First
Amendment, such as the making of photographs and audiovisual
recordings.95 This new generation of ag-gag provides animal
agriculture with “an unprecedented layer of secrecy.” 96 Iowa
spearheaded this new wave of ag-gag legislation in 2012 when it
established the crime of “agriculture production facility fraud,”
criminalizing the making of a “false statement or representation”
on an application for employment at an agriculture production
facility.97 Utah passed a similar law that same year, which, in
addition to criminalizing the use of false pretenses to gain access,
also made it a crime to “record an image of, or sound from, [an]
90. Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protection
Act (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1825); see also Marceau, supra note 73,
at 1333 (describing Kansas’s ag-gag statute as “illustrative” of the legislative
effort’s early iterations).
91. Montana Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act, H.B. 120,
1991 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1991) (codified at MONT. CODE §§ 81-30-101
(2015)); H.B. 1338, 52d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 1991) (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-21.1-01 (2013); see also Marceau, supra note 73, at 1334
(describing Montana’s ag-gag law as directed toward defamation yet doing
nothing to expand upon existing criminal liability for the spreading of
mistruths).
92. See Marceau, supra note 73, at 1333 (expressing no surprise that the
Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota ag-gag laws remain unused, since they
“did not really do anything new”; they simply “criminalized activity that was
already criminal”).
93. See id. at 1335–39 (describing the second, more restrictive wave of aggag legislation, enacted over 20 years after the initial version of these laws hit
the books).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Whereas “[a]ll industries are protected against trespass and the theft
of trade secrets . . . no other single industry has specific laws protecting it from
all whistleblowing, regardless of whether trade secrets or intellectual property
is threatened.” Id.
97. H.F. 589, 84th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2012) (codified at IOWA
CODE § 717A.3A) (2013)) (creating the crime of “agriculture production facility
fraud,” a serious misdemeanor). Somewhat redundantly, this law likewise
criminalizes the use of “false pretenses” to gain access to such a facility. Id.
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agricultural operation by leaving a recording device on the
agricultural operation.”98 Idaho followed this legislative trend in
2014 when it criminalized all employment-based investigations of
agriculture facilities.99
As the agenda behind the 2012–2015 ag-gag laws becomes
increasingly transparent, ag-gag advocates will have to find
alternative ways to effectuate their legislative goals. 100 Lobbyists in
Missouri accomplished this by passing a quick-report law.101
Similar to child-abuse mandatory-reporting laws,102 Missouri
Senate Bill 631 obligates “any farm animal professional” to submit
to law enforcement any recording he or she has made that depicts
farm animal abuse within twenty-four hours of the recording’s
creation.103 Such a law accomplishes the very same result as the
more overtly pro-agriculture laws of Iowa, Utah, and Idaho, yet does
so in a way that appears to be helping animals rather than covering
up their abuse.104 The effect, however, is very much the same as the
more overtly anti-whistleblower variety: “[I]f every act of cruelty
requires an immediate outing of the undercover investigator, then
showing patterns of abuse or complicity on the part of management
is impossible.”105 These laws are designed to prevent undercover
reporters from gathering enough evidence to build a solid case,
thereby “making it impossible to expose what is actually going on
inside factory farms.”106 Because these quick-report laws produce
the desired effect (the stifling of damaging exposés) without
98. H.B. 187, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012) (codified at UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-6-112) (2012), held unconstitutional by Animal Legal Defense Fund v.
Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (D. Utah 2017)).
99. S.B. 1337, 62d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2014) (codified at IDAHO CODE
§ 18-7042) (2014), held unconstitutional in part by Animal Legal Defense Fund
v. Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018)); see also
Marceau, supra note 73, at 1336 (describing creation of the crime of
“interference with agricultural production”).
100. See Marceau, supra note 73, at 1340 (explaining how Colorado and
Missouri have begun to “pave a new road” for enacting a new brand of ag-gag
laws).
101. See id. (describing Missouri’s seemingly innocuous, even honorable,
legislation to mandate quick reporting of animal abuse). Sponsors portray these
bills as “aids for animal welfare,” but “[i]n intent and effect these laws impede
journalistic and other undercover investigations of food producing facilities.” Id.
102. Id. (comparing animal-abuse quick-report laws with those that
mandate reporting of child abuse); but see Shea, supra note 82, at 364 (pointing
out that, unlike the recently popular quick-report ag-gag laws, other mandatory
reporting laws have “easily discernible” public policy rationales and “impose a
duty to report, but not a duty to report rapidly”) (emphasis added).
103. S.B. 631, 96th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012) (codified at MO.
REV. STAT. § 578.013) (2012)).
104. See Marceau, supra note 73, at 1340–41 (explaining how these quickreport laws “effectively accomplish the agriculture industry’s purpose of making
it impossible to expose what is actually going on inside factory farms”).
105. Id. at 1341.
106. Id. at 1340.
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creating the appearance of impropriety on behalf of industryfriendly legislators, some commentators have called these rapidreporting laws the “future” of ag-gag.107
3. Ag-Gag Evolved
One need only look at North Carolina to observe the shifting
tactics of industry lobbyists at work. In 2013, that state introduced
an anti-whistleblower measure that was more patently ag-gag.108
This bill followed on the heels of a major undercover exposé at a
North Carolina turkey slaughterhouse, which led to five criminal
convictions for cruelty to animals and the ousting of a top state
agriculture official on obstruction of justice. 109 In response to this
painful exposé, the North Carolina General Assembly introduced
the Commerce Protection Act—legislation which, despite its
application to a wide range of industries, was “clearly directed at
animal rights activists who threaten the profitability of factory
farms and slaughterhouses.”110
A statement issued by the North Carolina Chamber of
Commerce claimed S.B. 648 was “not an ‘ag-gag’ bill.”111 Yet the
statement made clear the bill’s primary effect was to protect North
Carolina businesses from damning media exposés, emphasizing
that activist groups and journalists are not the proper authorities
to investigate unlawful activity.112 The statement asserted that
“[l]aw enforcement is in the best position to make sure the abuse,
theft or other illegal activity is ended in a timely manner and the
individuals involved are prosecuted to the fullest.” 113 But this
justification did not pass muster. Twenty-five groups representing
a broad spectrum of public interests joined together to formally

107. See id. (noting “there is a certain superficial appeal to the idea that
refusing to report abuse is tantamount to abuse itself” and criticizing the
agriculture industry for its disingenuous attempts to sell these quick-reporting
laws as legislation “designed to protect animals”).
108. S.B. 648, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013).
109. Will Potter, New Ag-Gag Bill Introduced in North Carolina on Same
Day Butterball Worker Pleads Guilty to Cruelty, GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Apr.
8, 2013), www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/north-carolina-ag-gag-whistleblower
-law/6851/; see also Ag-Gag Debate, supra note 11 (describing the temporal
connection between the Butterball investigation and the introduction of the
2013 North Carolina ag-gag bill).
110. Leighton Akio Woodhouse, Charged with the Crime of Filming a
Slaughterhouse, THE NATION (July 31, 2013), www.thenation.com/article/charg
ed-crime-filming-slaughterhouse/.
111. Dan Flynn, ‘Ag-Gag’ Battle Moves On to North Carolina, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS (May 29, 2013), www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/05/ag-gag-battle-moveson-to-north-carolina/.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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voice their opposition to Senate Bill 648.114 The joint letter sent to
the bill’s sponsor was signed by the American Civil Liberties Union,
the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(ASPCA), Amnesty International, the Center for Constitutional
Rights, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, and even the National
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, among others. 115 North
Carolina Senate Bill 648 was ultimately reworked in committee to
completely get rid of the ag-gag provisions.116
But animal agriculture is a formidable force in North Carolina
politics, with “an influential, aggressive lobbying presence.” 117 Not
surprisingly then, ag-gag proponents did not give up after their
2013 effort fell short. In the spring of 2015, we saw the latest aggag flavor du jour surface in the North Carolina legislature.118
North Carolina House Bill 405 (the Property Protection Act)
embraced a new strategy designed to sidestep the constitutional
pitfalls miring its predecessors. 119 Rather than establish criminal
114. ACLU of North Carolina, ACLU-NC & Other Groups Announce
Opposition to North Carolina’s “Ag-Gag”/Anti-Whistleblower Legislation,
ALCU OF N.C. BLOG (May 31, 2013), www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/blog/aclu-ncother-groups-announce-opposition-to-north-carolina-s-ag-gag-antiwhistleblower-legislation.html.
115. Id. The letter read in part:
SB 648 would prevent transparency across all industries. . . . We hope
that you will choose to protect the safety of North Carolina’s residents
despite pressure from groups like the Chamber of Commerce which, in
its support for this bill, misses the fact that a loss of transparency is
ultimately bad for business, dangerous for consumers and a violation of
this country’s values.
Id.

116. Compare S.B. 648, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013) (as filed
Apr. 2, 2013), www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/Senate/HTML/S648v0.html,
with Sen. Judiciary II Comm. Substitute, S.B. 648, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 2013) (adopted June 11, 2013), www.ncleg.net/Applications/BillLoo
kUp/LoadBillDocument.aspx?SessionCode=2013&DocNum=8732&SeqNum=0.
117. Lindsay Abrams, North Carolina’s Chilling New Twist on “Ag-Gag”,
SALON (June 4, 2015), www.salon.com/2015/06/04/north_carolinas_chilling_ne
w_twist_on_ag_gag/. “The bill’s most prominent backer, the North Carolina
Chamber of Commerce, represents industry giants like Tyson, Smithfield
Foods, Pilgrim’s and Cargill, to name a few.” Id.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2 (2015).
119. See Animal Law Podcast #3 – Ag Gag With Justin Marceau, OUR HEN
HOUSE (Aug. 26, 2015), www.ourhenhouse.org/2015/08/animal-law-podcast-3-a
g-gag-with-justin-marceau/ (opining, “It seems clear that the industry kind of
knew it had stepped over the line in Idaho and has tried to reformulate ag gag
and take different approaches, for example the recent North Carolina law
. . . .”); Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1202 (D.
Idaho 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018) (holding IDAHO
CODE § 18-7042 violates the First Amendment right to freedom of speech as
well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since the
law “was motivated in substantial part by animus towards animal welfare
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liability for protected speech acts, the bill drafters chose to create a
civil cause of action for any private employer, regardless of industry,
who finds itself the target of an undercover employment-based
investigation.120 In this way, the Property Protection Act “hands the
power directly to the industry” to go after activist moles rather than
rely on the prosecutorial discretion of local law enforcement to file
charges under a criminal ag-gag statute.121 The State of Arkansas
enacted a nearly identical law in March 2017.122
Instead of criminal penalties, these new ag-gag laws authorize
extensive monetary damages (up to $5000 per day plus attorney’s
fees and court costs) for the hapless surveilled company. 123 In this
way, civil ag-gag legislation takes aim at the bread and (vegan)
butter of animal activism: the employment-based undercover
investigation. It allows employers to pursue civil charges against an
employee who takes photographs, shoots video, or commits several
other forms of “disloyal” conduct, holding them responsible for “any
damages incurred”—presumably including damages caused by
publication of the abuse.124 However, these publication damages are

groups, and because it impinges on free speech, a fundamental right.”); Animal
Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1211–13 (D. Utah 2017)
(striking down Utah’s ag-gag law on First Amendment grounds due to its
content-based provisions and the state’s utter failure to demonstrate a
compelling government interest).
120. Debate During Second Reading of H.B. 405 in the Senate, 2015 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015) (statement of N.C. Sen. Brent Jackson, May 18,
2015) (declaring, “House Bill 405 basically codifies and strengthens our North
Carolina case laws to better protect property owners; it does not create a
criminal penalty.”); see supra Part II–A (explaining undercover employmentbased investigations).
121. Abrams, supra note 117.
122. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113 (West 2017).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(d) (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113(e)(4).
But cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1828(a) (2015) (authorizing recovery “equal to
three times all actual and consequential damages” plus attorney’s fees and court
costs); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-104(1) (2015) (same); IDAHO CODE § 187042(4) (2014) (mandating restitution be paid “in an amount equal to twice the
value of the damage resulting from the violation.”), held unconstitutional in part
by Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905 (9th
Cir. Jan. 4, 2018). The civil recovery provisions in other states’ ag-gag statutes
do not provide for separate exemplary damages but rather calculate punitive
damages by doubling or tripling the amount of actual damages sustained; thus,
without actual damages, the ag-gag statutes of Kansas, Montana, and Idaho
disallow any civil recovery. Id.
As a further point of comparison, contrast North Carolina’s civil damages
provision with the maximum fines imposed by criminal ag-gag laws, ranging
from $500 to $2500 per offense. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-105(2) (establishing
maximum fine of $500); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(g)(3) (establishing ag-gag
offense as class A nonperson misdemeanor); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6611(b)(1)
(stating maximum fine for class A misdemeanor shall not exceed $2500).
124. Abrams, supra note 117.
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precisely the type of compensatory award disallowed in Food Lion
as a violation of free speech.125

III. ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the various ways in which constitutional
protections, public policy, and causation principles operate to shield
undercover investigators from liability for monetary damages. I
begin by examining common-law limitations on tort liability, using
the very apposite case Food Lion to demonstrate these principles at
work. I then hone in on the concept of employee duty of loyalty—a
recurring theme in discussions of investigator liability—and explore
the public-policy exceptions that have evolved out of this doctrine to
protect whistleblowers from retaliation. I also explain why
traditional channels of reporting for whistleblowers are not viable
options for employees in the animal-agriculture industry, thus
creating the need for undercover investigations. Finally, I conclude
by bringing these various concepts together in a detailed analysis of
the mechanisms limiting recovery under civil ag-gag provisions.
Specifically, I describe the applicable principles of free-speech
protection under the First Amendment and finish with a careful
consideration of the fascinating liability-limiting doctrine of
proximate causation.

A. Inbred Irony: Ag-Gag Proponents Celebrate Statutes’
Common-Law Heritage Despite Perceived
Shortcomings of Traditional Tort Liability
Limitations on common-law tort liability insulate the
surreptitious newsgatherer and truthful broadcaster from
responsibility for reputational harms sustained by the target of an
undercover exposé.126 Even where the target establishes a prima
facie case against the investigator, monetary damages will often be
unavailable.127 Food Lion neatly demonstrates this concept.128 The
grocery chain sued for reputational harm after ABC aired
undercover footage showing Food Lion employees engaging in
125. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion II), 194 F.3d 505,
522 (4th Cir. 1999); cf. Rep. Jordan, Sen. Commerce Committee (May 14, 2015)
(explaining that H.B. 405 specifically attempts to codify the principles set forth
in Food Lion II).
126. See generally infra Part III–C (describing at length how free-speech and
proximate-causation principles have been applied to limit recovery against
undercover whistleblowers).
127. See Food Lion II, 194 F.3d at 510–11 (denying recovery of damages
where investigators’ undercover work was not the proximate cause of company’s
loss).
128. Id.
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unsanitary food-handling practices.129 Rather than refute the
authenticity of the footage and sue for defamation, Food Lion
focused its claims on how the reporters obtained the footage.130 It
premised its case on theories of fraud, trespass, unfair trade
practices, and breach of employee duty of loyalty—seeking millions
in compensatory damages.131 Yet the district court held, and the
appellate court affirmed, that publication damages132 were not
recoverable (for reasons discussed in Part III–C below).133
Food Lion came up empty-handed even though the district and
appellate courts agreed that the defendants had engaged in tortious
conduct.134 The Fourth Circuit found the reporters liable for breach
of duty of loyalty and trespass. 135 By actively pursuing their
investigation for ABC while working as Food Lion employees, the
reporters breached their duty of loyalty to the supermarket plaintiff
and thereby committed a trespass. 136 In other words, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the jury’s trespass verdict by piggybacking
trespass liability on the defendants’ disloyal conduct.137 “Food Lion’s
129. Id. at 510–11.
130. Id. “Food Lion’s suit focused not on the broadcast, as a defamation suit
would, but on the methods ABC used to obtain the video footage.” Id. at 511.
131. Id. at 511.
132. The term “publication damages” refers to any injury that flows from
dissemination of information. See Susan M. Gilles, Food Lion As Reform or
Revolution: “Publication Damages” and First Amendment Scrutiny, 23 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 37, 62 (2000) (defining “publication damages” as those
damages which would not have occurred but for the publication of certain
information). Examples of publication damages include noneconomic injuries,
such as reputational harm and diminished consumer confidence, as well as
monetary damages (lost profits, diminished stock value, and the like) that flow
from a company’s marred reputation. Id.
133. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion I), 964 F. Supp.
956, 963 (M.D.N.C. 1997), aff’d on other grounds, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999);
Food Lion II, 194 F.3d at 522.
134. Food Lion II, 194 F.3d at 516.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 518. In other words, their breach automatically transformed the
reporters’ presence on Food Lion’s premises into a civil trespass. Id.
137. Id. at 516. At trial, the jury found the reporters liable for both breach
of duty of loyalty and trespass, “because they entered Food Lion’s premises as
employees with consent given because of the misrepresentations in their job
applications.” Id. at 518. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered whether
Food Lion’s consent to the defendants’ presence in the non-public areas of its
property was “void from the outset” due to their misrepresentations. Id. at 517.
The court offered, “Consent to an entry is often given legal effect even though it
was obtained by misrepresentation or concealed intentions. . . . [I]f we turned
successful resume fraud into trespass, we would not be protecting the interest
underlying the tort of trespass—the ownership and peaceable possession of
land.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, the
appellate court held that misrepresenting oneself on a job application does not
itself nullify the consent given to enter an employer’s premises. Id. at 517–18.
In other words, consent existed at the time employment began; in fact, consent
to enter was never vitiated. Yet the Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding of
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consent for them to be on its property was nullified when they
tortiously breached their duty of loyalty to Food Lion,” resulting in
a trespass.138 The court explained:
They went into areas of the stores that were not open to the public
and secretly videotaped, an act that was directly adverse to the
interests of . . . Food Lion [their employer]. Thus, they breached the
duty of loyalty, thereby committing a wrongful act in abuse of their
authority to be on Food Lion’s property.139

That language should sound familiar to anyone who tracked
North Carolina’s ag-gag law through the state legislature.140 During
legislative hearings and debate on North Carolina House Bill 405,
the bill’s sponsors borrowed heavily from the Fourth Circuit’s
opinion in defense of their bill.141 Even the language of the Act itself
closely tracks this portion of the Food Lion holding.142
In drafting House Bill 405, the bill’s sponsors expressly sought
to codify the common-law principles set forth in the Fourth Circuit’s
Food Lion analysis.143 The sponsors agreed with the federal
appellate court’s interpretation of North Carolina common law
regarding breach of employee duty of loyalty as an independent
tort.144 But disloyal conduct by an employee has rarely been
trespass because, “the breach of duty of loyalty—triggered by the filming in nonpublic areas, which was adverse to Food Lion—was a wrongful act in excess of
[the reporters’] authority to enter Food Lion’s premises as employees.” Id. at
518 (citing Blackwood v. Cates, 254 S.E.2d 7, 9 (N.C. 1979), in which the North
Carolina Supreme Court found defendants liable for trespass when their
activity on plaintiff’s property exceeded the scope of consent to enter). In other
words, the ABC reporters’ trespass was not trespass ab initio; their presence on
Food Lion’s property did not become trespassory until they began recording. Id.
138. Id. at 519.
139. Id. “As a matter of agency law, an employee owes a duty of loyalty to
her employer. . . . In North Carolina ‘the law implies a promise on the part of
every employee to serve [her] employer faithfully.’” Id. at 515 (quoting
McKnight v. Simpson’s Beauty Supply, Inc., 358 S.E.2d 107, 109 (N.C. Ct. App.
1987). But see Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704 (N.C. 2001) (holding breach of
an employee’s duty of loyalty is not actionable as an independent tort).
140. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2 (2015).
141. Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of N.C. Rep. Jonathan
Jordan, Sponsor, May 14, 2015) (explaining, “[A] lot of this proposed legislation
does codify from that case [Food Lion] specifically.”).
142. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(b)(1)-(2) (creating a cause of action against an
employee who “engages in an act that exceeds the person’s authority to enter
. . . the nonpublic areas of an employer’s premises.”); id. § 99A-2(b) (identifying
certain acts that amount to a breach of employee duty of loyalty as acts that
exceed the employee’s authority to enter).
143. See Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of N.C. Rep.
Jonathan Jordan, Sponsor, May 14, 2015); see also supra text accompanying
note 141.
144. Id. (“[W]e are agreeing with the Fourth Circuit and saying we agree
that our courts would rule that way.”); contra Dalton, 548 S.E.2d at 707–09
(expressly rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of North Carolina’s
duty-of-loyalty law). The sponsors of H.B. 405 clearly were not familiar with
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considered tortious in North Carolina,145 and even the state’s
highest court has held that breach of duty of loyalty is simply not
actionable as an independent tort. 146 Nevertheless, the drafters of
House Bill 405 chose to predicate liability on employee disloyalty. 147

B. A Closer Look at an Unproductive Tort—Employee
Duty of Loyalty
Employee duty of loyalty is a dynamic concept, acutely
intertwined with societal norms.148 In earlier years, the concept of
employee loyalty was characterized by a regime in which employees
were under “a duty of virtually unquestioning loyalty to protect and
preserve the employers’ interest and business.” 149 Yet, as economic
Dalton—a decision handed down by their own state’s highest court in 2001. Id.
145. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion II), 194 F.3d 505,
515 (4th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging “employee loyalty issues are usually dealt
with in the context of the employment contract; unfaithful employees are simply
discharged, disciplined, or reprimanded.”); cf. Long v. Verticle Techs., Inc., 439
S.E.2d 797, 802 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that, in North Carolina, an
employee may be discharged for disloyalty when he “deliberately acquires an
interest adverse to his employer”).
146. Dalton, 548 S.E.2d at 707–09 (expressly rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation of North Carolina tort law in Food Lion, to the extent that
holding could be read to sanction an independent action for breach of duty of
loyalty, and explaining that evidence of such a breach instead “serves only as a
justification for a defendant-employer in a wrongful termination action by an
employee”).
147. See Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80. Perhaps the sponsors’
disregard of Dalton was just an oversight, and it is ultimately irrelevant since
state legislatures may codify tort law concepts as specific statutory causes of
action. See, e.g., Kansas Uniform Partnership Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404
(2017) (codifying fiduciary duty of loyalty and care owed by a partner to the
partnership and to other partners); Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/2 (2017) (codifying common-law tort of
commercial disparagement under Illinois law); CAL. CIV. CODE § 43 (West 2017)
(codifying causes of action for common-law torts of assault, battery, and
invasion of privacy); Dragonetti Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8351 (2017) (codifying
common-law cause of action for wrongful use of civil proceedings); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-9-1 (2017) (codifying cause of action for common-law trespass).
Nevertheless, the bill sponsors’ complete inattention to Dalton is curious.
148. Benjamin Aaron, Employees’ Duty of Loyalty: Introduction and
Overview, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 143, 144 (1999).
149. Id. “Present laws governing the duty of employee loyalty all date back
to earlier historical periods when economic and social conditions were much
different.” Id.; accord. Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the
Employee’s Duty of Loyalty and Obedience, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 279, 288 (1979)
(describing mid-twentieth century sociopolitical underpinnings of duty-ofloyalty principles). Bear in mind that the common law conceptualizes an
employee’s duty of loyalty “in terms of economic activity, economic motivation,
and economic advantage” and is concerned with preventing an employee’s own
economic interests from “impairing his judgment, zeal, or single-minded
devotion to the furtherance of his principal's economic interests.” Id.
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pressures and notions of corporate responsibility have evolved, the
doctrine of employee loyalty has become increasingly qualified by
overriding concerns of public policy.150
1. Overview
Section 387 of the 1958 Restatement (Second) of Agency sets
forth the general principle that “an agent is subject to a duty to his
principle to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters
connected with his agency.”151 To that end, an agent is under a duty
“not to act or speak disloyally . . . except in the protection of his own
interests or those of others.”152 Thus, even the drafters of the midcentury Restatement recognized that the duty of loyalty has
important limitations.153
Over the last sixty years, this recognition has grown in
acceptance.154 The changing sociopolitical landscape brought with it
a departure from mid-twentieth century Restatement principles,155
as evidenced by divergent language in the recently drafted 2015
Restatement of Employment Law. 156 This Restatement of
Employment Law fleshes out the nuances of employee duty of
loyalty and reflects changes in public policy.157 It insinuates a
proportional relationship between the level of loyalty owed and the
employee’s position within the company.158 “As a general matter,
the duty of loyalty . . . has little practical application to the
employer’s ‘rank-and-file’ employees, i.e., employees who are
subject to the employer’s close oversight or supervision, or who are
not granted substantial discretion in carrying out their work
150. Aaron, supra note 148, at 144, 153.
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).
152. Id. at § 387 cmt. b (1968) (emphasis added); accord. Town of Plainville,
77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 161, 166 (1981) (Sacks, Arb.) (noting, “[A]gents are
privileged to reveal information in the protection of a superior interest of some
third person.”).
153. See Blumberg, supra note 149, at 289 (explaining, “[T]hese duties, as
the RESTATEMENT itself recognizes, have limitations.”).
154. See generally infra notes 155–166 and accompanying text (describing
growing recognition that an employee’s duty of loyalty has important publicpolicy limitations).
155. Blumberg, supra note 149, at 280 (explaining the “new view” on
traditional concepts of employee duties of loyalty which recognizes an
employee’s right to take action adverse to his employer’s interests where the
employee observes his corporate employer deviating from its proper social
responsibility).
156. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01 (2015).
157. Id. at § 8.01(a).
158. Id.; RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW (Tentative Draft No. 4), Reporters’
Memorandum (Apr. 11, 2011). For example, a heightened duty applies to
corporate executives and other agents in a position of trust and confidence,
whereas low-level employees in high-turnover positions owe a duty that is
considerably more basic (e.g., a duty not to steal). Id.
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responsibilities.”159 Of course, even low-level employees who are not
in a position of trust and confidence (and who, therefore, do not owe
a fiduciary duty to the employer) may nevertheless owe an “implied
contractual duty of loyalty . . . in matters related to their
employment.”160 Indeed, “it is hard to conceive of an efficient,
harmonious enterprise” without at least some expectation of
employee loyalty.161 Even so, the law now recognizes that this duty
must be interpreted in a manner consistent with employee rights
and public policy.162
To the drafters of the 2015 Restatement, this meant whittling
down the duty of loyalty to three narrow areas: (1) trade secrets; (2)
direct competition; and (3) theft or self-dealing.163
According to the Restatement drafters, breach of this duty does
not amount to an independent tort.164 “Employees who owe an
implied contractual duty of loyalty are subject only to contract
remedies for breach . . . .”165 Even the Food Lion court acknowledged
that employee loyalty issues are generally dealt with in the context
of the employment contract: disloyal employees are simply
terminated or internally reprimanded.166
Thus, the clear trend has been toward a relaxation of loyalty
standards in light of other policy considerations—namely,
whistleblowing.167 Yet the sponsors of North Carolina’s civil ag-gag
159. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01 cmt. a (2015); accord. Interview
with TJ Tumasse, supra note 31 (explaining undercover investigators
conducting an employment-based investigation generally apply for the lowestlevel positions at the target facility); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
(Food Lion II), 194 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 1999) (characterizing reporters’ deli
jobs “entry level” positions).
160. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01(a); cf. Animal Legal Defense Fund
v. Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905, at *12 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018) (citing
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233 (2005)) (noting that an employee
who accepts a job with “an intent to harm” the employer breaches “the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing that is implied in all employment agreements in
Idaho,” yet failing to define “harm”).
161. Blumberg, supra note 149, at 298.
162. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01(c); cf. Animal Legal Defense Fund
v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1205 (D. Utah 2017) (noting, in dicta, that the
point at which “an invited guest become[s] a trespasser as a result of making
misrepresentations to the property owner” is an issue “mired in competing
policy considerations”).
163. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01(b); see also id. at § 8.01 cmt. b
(detailing the “three principal aspects” of an employee’s duty of loyalty).
164. Id. at § 8.01 cmt. e; see also Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707–09
(N.C. 2001); supra text accompanying note 146 (describing N.C. Supreme Court
decision which held breach of duty of loyalty is not actionable as an independent
tort). This was the view taken by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Dalton.
Id.
165. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01 cmt. e (emphasis added).
166. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion II), 194 F.3d 505,
515 (4th Cir. 1999).
167. See infra Part III–B–2.
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law went entirely against this trend in enacting the Property
Protection Act, creating a statutory cause of action against certain
disloyal employees.168 The North Carolina sponsors’ activity
disregarded the well-known admonition of U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter: “To say that an agent has duties of
loyalty and obedience only begins [the] analysis . . . . One must
inquire more deeply and ascertain the outer perimeters of the
agent’s obligations by balancing the conflicting considerations.” 169
When it comes to exposing employer practices that run contrary to
the public interest, an employee’s moral obligations outweigh any
legal obligation she owes to her employer.
2. Whistleblowing in the Workplace: Socially Acceptable
Disloyalty
An employee who reports employer wrongdoing is commonly
said to have “blown the whistle” on her employer. 170 Whistleblowing
in the employment context necessarily involves conduct that is
adverse to the employer’s interests: Companies that engage in legal
or moral wrongs generally do so as a means of increasing profits;
once exposed, the company must swap these advantageous
practices for more costly ones, inevitably impacting its bottom
line.171 In addition, the company may experience fallout in the form
of diminished consumer confidence, lost sales, lawsuits, or even
criminal charges.172 Considering these repercussions, an employee’s
outing of his employer’s misdeeds may be described as “disloyal” in
common parlance. However, the whole doctrine of loyalty rests on
“a policy of protecting the economic position of the principal against
impairment by reason of an agent’s effort to achieve economic
gain.”173 These policy concerns are simply not applicable to the
employee who releases damning information about his employer
“without intent to obtain economic advantage for himself . . . .”174
When an employee’s conduct is “motivated by a desire to promote

168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(b)(1)–(2) (2015). The Arkansas legislature
followed suit in 2017, creating a nearly identical cause of action premised on
the notion of employee disloyalty. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113 (2017) (creating
a civil cause of action against any employee who uses surreptitiously collected
information “in a manner that damages the employer”).
169. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943).
170. Whistleblower, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, www.etymonline.co
m/index.php?term=whistleblower (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
171. Blumberg, supra note 149, at 297.
172. See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion II), 194
F.3d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 1999).
173. Blumberg, supra note 149, at 289.
174. Id.
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"the public good,” public policy dictates that employee ought to be
protected against disloyalty claims.175
Whistleblower protections recognize the gatekeeper function of
employees when it comes to safeguarding public health and
consumer interests.176 “[A]n employee’s duty of loyalty is effectively
overridden by this gatekeeper role and the public’s interest in
learning of matters related to public health and safety.” 177 To that
end, the act of blowing the whistle may be conceptualized as either
a privileged breach of employee duty of loyalty (i.e., the conduct was
disloyal yet not actionable) or as no breach at all (i.e., the duty of
loyalty simply does not extend to matters of employer
wrongdoing).178
Despite their merits, whistleblower protections are not without
controversy. Public-interest groups seeking to facilitate publicsafety disclosures are pitted against conservative groups seeking to
protect the economic interests of employers.179 The crux of the
public-safety disclosure proposal essentially states that “ethics
should take precedence over loyalty to employers when the public
interest is at stake.”180 This sentiment is reflected in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Pickering v. Board of Education,181
“encouraging citizens interested in working for a better society to
place their interests as citizens above the interests of their
employer.”182 Proponents of this view urge employees to disclose
corporate wrongdoing to a public interest organization so that the

175. Id.; accord. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan,
Employee Disclosures to the Media: When Is a “Source” a “Sourcerer”?, 15
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 357, 387 n.196 (1993) (explaining Blumberg’s
definition of “whistleblower”).
176. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS § 17:4 (2015).
177. Id.
178. Morehead & Callahan, supra note 175, at 388 (“[A]n employee
whistleblower does not violate his or her duty of loyalty by disclosing such
information.”); see, e.g., Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1460–
63 (D. Colo. 1997). In Marsh, a disgruntled airline employee wrote a letter to
the editor of a local newspaper criticizing his employer, Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Marsh, 952 F. Supp. at 1460. In the letter, the employee “vented his
frustrations” about his employer and “strongly criticized” Delta for its
personnel/staffing decisions. Id. Delta fired the employee as a result of his
writing the article. Id. at 1461. The employee then sued for wrongful discharge.
Id. The court dismissed the lawsuit, finding the employee had breached his duty
of loyalty to Delta and, as a result, his termination was not wrongful. Id. at
1463. The court noted, however, that had the employee’s critical remarks made
public some aspect of Delta’s conduct that was undermining passenger safety,
then “the implied duty of loyalty would be inapplicable to Plaintiff’s actions.”
Id. Publicly airing merely personal grievances, on the other hand, was a disloyal
act unworthy of whistleblower protection. Id.
179. Blumberg, supra note 149, at 280–81, 297.
180. Id. at 280.
181. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
182. Blumberg, supra note 149, at 303 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. 563).
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issue may be campaigned “in the public arena” rather than swept
under the rug by corporate higher-ups or apathetic law
enforcement.183
Industry protectionists counter that employers “will
undoubtedly incur economic loss” as a result of employees blowing
the whistle.184 They portend “a loss of human values within the
organization” as well as “a general impairment of group
identification, group loyalty, and morale” as invidious consequences
of whistleblowing.185 These critics further insinuate that an
employee’s decision to disclose information, while sometimes
selfless, may occasionally involve “improper motivation,” such as a
desire to injure the employer or promote a political agenda. 186 One
commentator, Phillip Blumberg, lamented, “Once the duty of loyalty
yields to the primacy of what the individual in question regards as
the ‘public interest,’ the door is open to widespread abuse.” 187 To
ameliorate the detrimental effects of employee whistleblowing
(which are often amplified by media exposure), Blumberg suggested
imposing “statutory and administrative requirements of disclosure”
to limit an employee’s reporting of abuses to public enforcement
agencies only.188 Enforcement by public agencies, he noted, “would
serve the basic object without the serious disadvantages [of public
exposure]. . . . Private vigilante efforts should not be essential to
achieve effective administration.”189
183. Id. at 281; but cf. Debate in the House on Motion to Override Governor’s
Veto of H.B. 405, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015) (statement of N.C.
Rep. John Szoka, Sponsor, June 3, 2015) (asserting that allegations of employer
wrongdoing ought to be disclosed to “proper authorities,” i.e., “law enforcement
and state and federal regulatory agencies . . . not the media, and not private
special-interest organizations”); Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, 118 F.
Supp. 3d 1195, 1200 (D. Idaho 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Animal
Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905 (9th Cir. Jan. 4,
2018) (describing the expressed desire of Dan Steenson, drafter of Idaho’s aggag legislation, “to shield Idaho dairymen and other farmers from undercover
investigators and whistleblowers who expose the agricultural industry to ‘the
court of public opinion.’”).
184. Blumberg, supra note 149, at 297.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 298; see also Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of
N.C. Rep. Jonathan Jordan, Sponsor, May 14, 2015) (calling an employee’s
intentions “the crux of the issue”); cf. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden,
No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905, at *12 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018) (noting “intent to
injure” is a requisite element for conviction under IDAHO CODE § 18–7042(1)(c)
but failing to explain what type of injury must be intended). One could argue
that it is this “improper motivation” that the North Carolina legislature was
trying to isolate in its statute. Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement
of N.C. Rep. Jonathan Jordan, Sponsor, May 14, 2015). However, an employee’s
motivation arguably ought to be irrelevant if the result is a more informed
public on matters of great public importance.
187. Blumberg, supra note 149, at 314.
188. Id. at 315.
189. Id.
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A decade or two after Blumberg published his industryprotective admonitions, commentators and arbiters began to
acknowledge the inevitable need for media disclosure in many cases
of corporate wrongdoing.190 Where an employee reasonably believes
his superiors will do a poor or dishonest job investigating the
matter, that employee may be privileged to bypass internal
channels and go directly to third parties. 191 In such cases, the
employer would not have just cause to penalize the employee who
blew the whistle to the media. 192
In addition, practical considerations provide employees with a
certain amount of de facto protection. An employer’s ability to seek
redress against an employee who disloyally blows the whistle is
limited as a practical matter, “at least in those cases where public
sympathy is squarely behind the employee.”193 Even where the law
condemns an employee’s unauthorized conduct, the employer’s
freedom of action against that employee “will be severely restricted
by the climate of public opinion which may well have been
significantly influenced by the publicity attending the affair.” 194
Whether or not an employee’s disclosure violates traditional norms
embedded in the law of agency, the modern public’s pervasive
concern with corporate social responsibility places the presumption
of wrongdoing squarely against the employer.195 Aggrieved
employers will hardly feel free to resort to legal or equitable
remedies for redress where the employee’s unauthorized disclosures
expose corporate misconduct and do not reflect economic motivation
on behalf of the employee in exposing it. 196

190. Morehead & Callahan, supra note 175, at 378; see also Town of
Plainville, 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 161, 167 (1981) (Sacks, Arb.) (agreeing with
employee for not first using internal channels to resolve allegations against his
employer where employee reasonably felt his claims would be met with distain
by upper management).
191. Town of Plainville, 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 167 (insinuating,
however, that public authorities still ought to be consulted before turning to
news outlets); cf. Debate in the House on Motion to Override Governor’s Veto of
H.B. 405, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015) (statement of N.C. Rep.
Pat McElraft, June 3, 2015) (“[W]e should get law enforcement involved and not
cameras involved, because cameras can lie. They pick one little thing that’s
happening somewhere, and then they throw it out there in the public to think
that that’s what all slaughterhouses are doing, et cetera.”).
192. Morehead & Callahan, supra note 175, at 378.
193. Blumberg, supra note 149, at 312.
194. Id. “Unless the corporation can prevail in the battle for public opinion
on the merits of the conduct in issue, it must yield to public clamor or face the
consequences of unfavorable public reaction.” Id.
195. Id. at 313.
196. Id.; see also Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of N.C.
Rep. Jonathan Jordan, Sponsor, May 14, 2015) (deploring the greedy employee
who takes footage of employer wrongdoing and “run[s] out to a news outlet to
sell it for a lot of money”).
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The company that is guilty of animal abuse, worker-safety
violations, unethical practices, or other corner-cutting designed to
line its pockets at the expense of public safety and morals would do
well not to compound its conduct by instituting action against the
employee who brought the abuse to light. 197 To do so would be to
“assure even greater adverse publicity.” 198 This is precisely the
reaction we saw in response to charges against animal activists in
at least two different scenarios. In 2013, when news that an activist
in Utah had been charged under that state’s ag-gag law for filming
the abuse of sick and injured dairy cows, the prosecutor’s office was
hit with a flood of outrage from all over the country. 199 National
media outlets soon picked up the story, bringing precisely the kind
of public attention to the industry that ag-gag legislation was
designed to prevent.200 Within twenty-four hours, the ag-gag
charges were dropped.201 In 2014, undercover investigator Taylor
Radig was charged with animal cruelty after turning over footage
she recorded at Quanah Cattle Co., a veal calf-rearing facility near
Kersey, Colorado.202 The footage led to criminal animal abuse
charges against three of the Quanah workers. 203 So why was Radig
charged? She had “waited too long” to turn over the footage to law
enforcement.204 After vehement public outcry and nearly 200,000
petition signatures, the charges against Taylor were dropped.205 In
a brief statement, the county prosecutor simply said the charges

197. Blumberg, supra note 149, at 313.
198. Id.
199. Will Potter, Amy Meyer’s Ag-Gag Charges Have Been Dropped!, GREEN
IS THE NEW RED (Apr. 30, 2013), www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/amy-meyercharges-dropped/6998/.
200. Woodhouse, supra note 110.
201. Potter, supra note 199; Jim Dalrymple, Utah Prosecutor Dismisses
Suddenly High-Profile ‘Ag Gag’ Case, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (May 1, 2013,
7:39 AM), http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/sltrib/news/56240592-78/cas
e-meyer-law-gag.html.csp. Of course, the prosecutor claimed the media
attention “did not have bearing on his decision to dismiss the case.” Id. Instead
he simply stated, “I determined that in [the] interest of justice I wouldn’t pursue
the matter.” Id.
202. Dan Flynn, Prosecutor Dismisses Charge of Animal Cruelty Against
Undercover Investigator, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 13, 2014), www.foodsafety
news.com/2014/01/charge-of-animal-cruelty-against-undercover-investigator-di
smissed-by-prosecutor/.
203. Id.
204. Id. Animal welfare groups investigating institutionalized cruelty need
time to show a pattern of abuse, which is not possible if the investigator is
required to blow her cover by reporting the first abuse she sees. Id.
205. Will Potter, Charges Dropped Against Investigator Who Filmed Animal
Cruelty, GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Jan. 11, 2014), www.greenisthenewred.com/bl
og/taylor-radig-charges-dropped/7492/; Abby Spiwak, Drop Animal Cruelty
Charge Against Undercover Investigator in Colorado, CHANGE.ORG, www.chang
e.org/p/drop-animal-cruelty-charge-against-undercover-investigator-incolorado (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
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could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and were therefore
dismissed.206
Back in Utah, a more recent incident suggests that some
industry members are actually beginning to acknowledge the
practical limitations on the use of anti-whistleblower legislation.207
After four activists were charged with “agricultural operation
interference”208 for photographing a hog farm in Iron County, Utah,
the charges were promptly dropped at the hog producer’s request.209
Yet the foresight of a handful of livestock producers has not been
enough to stem the tide of ag-gag legislation in this country. 210 In
addition to the 2015 law that passed in North Carolina, antiwhistleblower legislation tailored specifically to protect animal
agriculture was introduced in Arkansas, 211 Kentucky212 and
Washington,213 and ag-gag legislation of the quick-reporting

206. Press Release, Weld County District Attorney’s Office, Charges
Dismissed Against Woman Who Filmed Calf Abuse (Jan. 10, 2014), www.co.we
ld.co.us/assets/6b43d37dAA7AA6074752.pdf.
207. Dan Flynn, Utah Prosecutor Drops ‘Ag-Gag’ Charges Against Vegan
Activists, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 13, 2015), www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/0
1/charges-against-four-vegan-activists-under-utah-ag-gag-dropped/.
208. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (LexisNexis 2017), held unconstitutional
by Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (D. Utah 2017).
“Agricultural operation interference” is the fancy name for the offense created
under Utah’s ag-gag law. Id.
209. Flynn, supra note 207. The producer whose property was photographed,
Circle Four Farms, has been owned since 2013 by Smithfield Foods, Inc., the
world’s largest pork producer. Id.
210. See generally infra notes 211–218 and accompanying text (describing
ag-gag laws considered in various states’ legislatures in 2015).
211. H.B. 1774, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015); see also Last
Chance for Animals, A Triumph for LCA as Arkansas Gag Bill Fails, LCA BLOG
(Apr. 3, 2015), www.lcanimal.org/index.php/blog/entry/a-triumph-for-lca-as-ark
ansas-gag-bill-fails (describing scope of H.B. 1774, which would have severely
restricted undercover investigations by prohibiting the recording of
conversations between coworkers in an employment setting unless all parties
had knowingly consented to the recording).
212. H.B. 177, amend. 5, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2015).
213. H.B. 1104, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015); see also Leah Sottile,
‘Ag-Gag’ Proposal Meets Torrent of Opposition in Washington State, ALJAZEERA
(Jan. 22, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/22/Ag-ga
g-bill-angers-animal-rights-supporters-in-Washington-state.html (describing
Wash. Rep. Joe Schmick’s proposed law that mirrors Idaho’s now-defunct aggag statute, criminalizing audio or visual recording on the premises of an
agricultural facility).
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variety214 was also considered in Colorado,215 Montana,216 New
Mexico217 and Wisconsin218 that same year. The State of Arkansas
is the most recent state to enact an ag-gag statute, adopting the text
of North Carolina’s law nearly verbatim. 219

214. See generally supra notes 101–107 and accompanying text (describing
quick-reporting ag-gag laws); see also Shea, supra note 82 (presenting quickreporting laws as the future of ag-gag legislation).
215. S.B. 15-042, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2015); see also
Justin Marceau & Nancy Leong, Proposed Bill Will Lead to More Animal Abuse,
Not Less, DENVER POST (Jan. 23, 2015), www.denverpost.com/ci_27381708/pro
posed-bill-will-lead-more-animal-abuse-not (explaining adverse effects of
Colorado Senate Bill 42, which would have required reporting of animal abuse
within 48 hours); Ag-Gag Bills Continue to Flourish in 2015, NAT’L ANTIVIVISECTION SOC’Y (Aug. 3, 2015), www.navs.org/news/ag-gag-bills-continue-toflourish-in-2015 (announcing S.B. 15-042 was postponed indefinitely shortly
after its introduction and died in committee at the end of the legislative session).
216. S.B. 285, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2015); see also Troy Carter, Bill
Criminalizes Not Reporting Animal Cruelty, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRONICLE (Feb.
17, 2015), www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/mtleg/bill-criminalizes-not-re
porting-animal-cruelty/article_8145f262-0129-5b02-bf44-509b00613594.html
(quoting the bill’s sponsor, Mont. Sen. Eric Moore, explaining the bill’s purpose
was to “make[] sure that someone who witnesses [and records] animal abuse
isn’t able to use it for political purposes”).
217. S.B. 221, 52d Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2015); but see New Mexico
Legislature Lets Partial ‘Ag-Gag’ Bill Languish, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 19,
2015), www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/03/new-mexico-legislature-lets-partial-a
g-gag-bill-languish-in-committee/ (announcing New Mexico’s quick-report aggag bill “is almost certainly dead” after languishing in the state Senate
Judiciary Committee).
218. See Rob Schultz, Legislator Wants to Introduce Controversial ‘Ag-Gag’
Bill, WIS. ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2015), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/legislat
or-wants-to-introduce-controversial-ag-gag-bill/article_6eb375b3-3b2e-5d6f881c-2d3e8f25e9b0.html (announcing Wis. Rep. Lee Nerison’s intent to
introduce a quick-reporting ag-gag bill “at the behest of farmers and others who
told him their reputations have been put on the line by undercover
investigators.”); but see Rep. Lee Nerison, WIS. ST. LEG., http://docs.legis.wisco
nsin.gov/2015/legislators/assembly/1329 (last visited Jan. 28, 2018) (showing
that, ultimately, for reasons that are unclear, Rep. Nerison’s bill was not
introduced that session).
219. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113 (2017).
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3. Whistleblowing in the Animal Agriculture Industry: Why
Traditional Channels for Reporting Are Not an Option
Ag-gag proponents claim that reporting animal and worker
abuse to law enforcement is the proper, 220 ethical,221 and most
effective222 means of stopping animal abuse. Experience, however,
suggests the contrary. Regulatory authorities frequently shirk their
enforcement duties;223 district attorneys routinely refuse to
prosecute abusers even when presented with clear evidence; 224 and
egregious violations escape with nothing more than a slap on the
wrist.225
The country received a serious wake-up call in 2008 when an
undercover investigation revealed outrageous violations of foodsafety laws at a cattle processing plant in Chino, California. 226
USDA inspectors stationed at the plant—the very “authorities” in
whom industry protectionists place so much faith—consistently
turned a blind eye as ill and injured cattle entered the U.S. food
supply, destined for the National School Lunch Program. 227 As one
exasperated reporter wrote, “The U.S. Department of Agriculture
has 7800 pairs of eyes scrutinizing 6200 slaughterhouses and food
220. See Debate in the House on Motion to Override Governor’s Veto of H.B.
405, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015) (statement of N.C. Rep. John
Szoka, Sponsor, June 3, 2015) (asserting that law enforcement and government
agencies, as opposed to activist groups or the media, are the “proper authorities”
to whom allegations of employer wrongdoing ought to be disclosed); see also Dan
Flynn, ‘Ag-Gag’ Battle Moves On to North Carolina, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (May
29, 2013), www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/05/ag-gag-battle-moves-on-to-northcarolina/ (describing industry’s position that law enforcement is the “proper
authority” to investigate such allegations).
221. Governor’s Veto Message, H.B. 405, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015)
(May 29, 2015), http://ncleg.net/Sessions/2015/h405Veto/letter.pdf (claiming
reporting illegal activity to law enforcement is the proper alternative to
“unethical” undercover investigations).
222. Flynn, supra note 220 (“[L]aw enforcement officials are in the best
position to make sure the abuse, theft or other illegal activity is ended in a
timely manner . . . .”) (emphasis added).
223. See generally infra notes 226–231 and accompanying text.
224. See generally infra notes 233–247 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Ted Genoways, “Hurt That Bitch”: What Undercover
Investigators Saw Inside a Factory Farm, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 16, 2014, 5:10
AM), www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/10/hog-hell-inside-story-peta-in
vestigation-mowmar-farms?page=2 (describing conduct by MowMar Farm
workers Alan Rettig and Richard Ralston, which included hitting, kicking, and
anally penetrating sows with gate rods and herding canes); Michael J. Crumb,
Four in Iowa sentenced to probation for abusing pigs, TIMES-REPUBLICAN (June
28, 2009), www.timesrepublican.com/page/content.detail/id/517629/Four-in-Io
wa-sentenced-to-probation-for-abusing-pigs.html (reporting that Ralston and
Rettig were each sentenced to two years’ probation with no jail time).
226. Victoria Kim, Questions Raised on Meat Safety, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7,
2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/07/local/me-usda7.
227. Id.
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processors across the nation. But in the end, it took an undercover
operation by an animal rights group to reveal that beef from ill and
abused cattle had entered the human food supply.”228
As it turns out, this is terribly common, at least among USDA
inspectors. Former undercover investigator TJ Tumasse recalls
frequently seeing USDA inspectors sitting around on their cell
phones, flirting with female workers, texting friends, and not
watching for contaminated carcasses or abusive handling practices
at all.229 “They didn’t want to be there, and it showed.”230 Dean
Cliver, a food safety expert who had previously served in advisory
roles at both the FDA and USDA, likewise lamented, “USDA has to
read about this stuff in the newspaper before they take action.” 231
Inaction by authorities is not limited to regulatory agencies.
Prosecutors have also repeatedly failed to bring charges when
presented with evidence of animal abuse.232 A 2015 investigation of
a Minnesota hog farm revealed graphic mistreatment of piglets that
the facility’s own manager called “disturbing.” 233 The video showed
sows bleeding from open sores, lame from swollen legs, and
suffering from other injuries, including untreated prolapses and
protruding organs.234 It also showed one worker repeatedly jabbing
a lame sow with a pen in an attempt to get her to move, leaving
wounds on her back.235 The group Last Chance for Animals, which
coordinated the investigation, said it had “recorded numerous
instances of sick and severely injured sows being left to suffer for
weeks.”236 Despite this inculpatory footage, the county prosecutor
declared he would not file animal cruelty charges against the
workers since the methods used at the facility were “within industry
standards.”237
228. Id.
229. Interview with TJ Tumasse, supra note 31.
230. Id.
231. Kim, supra note 226. Cliver continued, “We rely on a system, and the
system dropped the ball.” Id.
232. See generally infra notes 233–249 and accompanying text (describing
numerous examples in which prosecutors declined to bring charges despite
unequivocal evidence of animal abuse and torture).
233. Steve Karnowski, Minnesota Prosecutor Won’t Charge Hog Farm
Workers in Undercover Video, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Oct. 10, 2015, 9:12
AM), www.twincities.com/crime/ci_28947366/prosecutor-wont-charge-minnesot
a-hog-farm-workers.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. The prosecutor further justified his office’s inaction by criticizing
the videos as “highly edited and filtered to enhance [LCA’s] position . . .” Id.
However, when LCA offered to turn over “full unedited copies of its original
recordings,” the prosecutor still showed no interest. Id. Adam Wilson, LCA’s
director of investigations, called the decision not to prosecute “a political one”—
that the local prosecutor did not want “to go after a very large corporate farming
operation that’s a Minnesota company.” Id.
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Prosecutors’ obsession with “industry standards” has been a
repeating theme. After the animal-rights group Mercy For Animals
(MFA) conducted an investigation of West Coast Farms—an
Oklahoma business that supplies pork products to Tyson Foods—
assistant district attorney for Okfuskee County said she “wanted to
learn more about industry standards” before deciding whether
criminal charges were warranted. 238 MFA’s footage captured
workers hitting, kicking, throwing, and striking animals, “sticking
fingers in their eyes, and leaving piglets to die slowly after they
were slammed into the ground ‘in failed euthanasia attempts.’” 239
The workers were never charged.240
A year later, another Mercy For Animals investigation landed
on the desk of yet another unenthusiastic prosecutor, this time in
Shawano County, Wisconsin.241 The target of the investigation was
Andrus Dairy.242 After gaining employment at Andrus as a
farmhand, the undercover investigator documented his coworkers
violently kicking and punching cows, even violently swinging and
hitting one animal with a metal rod. 243 The video shows workers
“drag a cow across a barn with a four-wheeler.”244 At the conclusion
of its investigation, Mercy For Animals turned the video over to
authorities.245 After reviewing the footage, the Dairy State
prosecutor for Shawano County “said that nothing in the video
warrants criminal charges.”246
An investigation revealing severe abuse and neglect at New
York’s largest dairy farm was received by state law enforcement

238. Anna Schecter, Monica Alba, & Lindsay Perez, Tyson Foods Dumps Pig
Farm After NBC Shows Company Video of Alleged Abuse, NBC NEWS (Nov. 20,
2013, 6:12 AM), www.nbcnews.com/news/other/tyson-foods-dumps-pig-farm-aft
er-nbc-shows-company-video-f2D11627571.
239. Id.
240. Martha Rosenberg, Pig Cruelty in Oklahoma, COUNTERPUNCH (Oct. 31,
2014), www.counterpunch.org/2014/10/31/pig-cruelty-in-oklahoma/.
241. Scott Falkner, ‘Horrific Cruelty’ to Cows Caught on Video – District
Attorney Refuses to Press Charges, INQUISITR (Nov. 13, 2014), www.inquisitr.co
m/1606522/horrific-cruelty-to-cows-caught-on-video-district-attorney-refuses-t
o-press-charges/.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.; The State of Wisconsin, NETSTATE (last updated July 28, 2017), ww
w.netstate.com/states/intro/wi_intro.htm (describing the origin of Wisconsin’s
nickname, “The Dairy State”). An assistant district attorney for the county
added, “[T]he actions of the employees caught on video do not amount to a
situation where criminal charges are warranted based upon the review of state
and local vets.” Local District Attorney Decides Not to Prosecute over Latest
Mercy for Animals Video, FOOD SAFETY NETWORK (Nov. 13, 2014), www.foodsa
fetynews.com/2014/11/local-district-attorney-decides-not-to-prosecute-over-late
st-mercy-video/.
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with similar apathy.247 The footage showed cows with open sores
and prolapses, animals so weak they could move only their eyes,
and even an employee bragging about “stomping” animals,
“braining” a cow with a two-by-four, and “cracking animals’ skulls
with wrenches.”248 Reacting to the footage, Assistant District
Attorney Diane Adsit of the Cayuga County prosecutor’s office
purportedly exclaimed, “Who cares.” 249
In light of these and numerous other instances of law
enforcement dragging its feet when presented with clear-cut cases
of animal abuse at commercial livestock operations, proponents of
ag-gag laws are left with little ground to stand on. Their claim that
law enforcement and regulatory agencies are the “proper
authorities” to whom whistleblowers ought to report abuse is clearly
flawed. Legislators and industry lobbyists who want to limit the
channels through which whistleblowers may report abuse clearly do
not have the animals’ best interests in mind. Their concern lies
solely in protecting livestock producers from the economic backlash
that inevitably occurs when consumers get a glimpse of the goingson behind factory farm doors and take their business elsewhere. 250
4. Civil Recovery Under Ag-Gag: Damages Dosed with
Growth Hormones Bear No Resemblance to CommonLaw Tradition
The North Carolina and Arkansas ag-gag laws accomplish
their industry-protective goal by authorizing extensive damages
against the employment-based undercover investigator who reveals
wrongdoing on company premises. 251 Both states’ statutes authorize
courts to award compensatory damages, as well as exemplary
(punitive) damages “in the amount of $5,000 for each day” that an
employee acts in breach of his duty of loyalty (e.g., by
surreptitiously recording their employer’s illegal or unethical

247. Martha Rosenberg, No Charges Filed Yet in Dairy Atrocity Seen on
Nightline, ALTERNET (Mar. 30, 2010), www.alternet.org/speakeasy/2010/03/30/
no-charges-filed-yet-in-dairy-atrocity-seen-on-nightline.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See generally supra notes 73–84, 131 and accompanying text
(describing successful results of undercover exposés).
251. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(d) (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113(e)
(2017).
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practices).252 The statutes also provide for attorneys’ fees and court
costs.253
The provision of punitive damages in the North Carolina law
is a significant departure from the sponsors’ stated intention to
codify the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Food Lion.254 In that case, the
grocery chain sued to recover administrative costs of hiring and
wages paid to the allegedly unfaithful reporters, as well as
“publication damages” in compensation for its noticeable drop in
retail sales and diminished stock value in the wake of ABC’s
broadcast. The appellate court denied Food Lion any and all
compensatory damages for the reporters’ conduct, awarding the
company a grand total of two dollars in nominal damages for its
trespass and breach of loyalty claims. 255 In doing so, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the lower court’s award of punitive damages as
well.256
252. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(d)(4); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113(e); see also
Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of N.C. Rep. Paul Stam, Vice
Chairman, Apr. 21, 2015) (explaining, “Exemplary damages are really punitive
damages.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, cmt. a (1979) (describing
purpose of awarding punitive, also known as “exemplary,” damages). Even in
states where breach of an employee’s duty of loyalty is actionable as an
independent tort, punitive damages for breach of an employee’s duty of loyalty
have been found appropriate only where the breach amounted to a diversion of
the employer’s business or other corporate opportunity (Chapes v. Pro-Pac, Inc.,
473 B.R. 295 (E.D. Wis. 2012); Central Sec. & Alarm Co. v. Mehler, 121 N.M.
840, 918 P.2d 1340 (1996)), misappropriation of employer property (Abbey
Med./Abbey Rents, Inc. v. Mignacca, 471 A.2d 189 (R.I. 1984)) such as
proprietary consumer lists (Phoenix Fin. Corp. v. Radford, 44 Va. Cir. 445
(1998) (establishing a “willful and malicious” standard for mens rea)), or
misappropriation of employer’s business model, customers, and confidential or
commercially sensitive documents in order to open a competing business (Pure
Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 813 F. Supp. 2d 489
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)). Employers suing for breach of duty of loyalty have been denied
punitive damages where breach took the form of poaching other employees for
a competitor (Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 408 F. App’x 162
(10th Cir. 2011)) or promoting the award of a business contract to a company in
direct competition with his employer (Design Strategies, Inc. v. Davis, 384 F.
Supp. 2d 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469
F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2006)).
253. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(d)(3); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113(e)(3); see
also Judith L. White, Critical Reappraisal of Punitive Damages Encompassing
Attorneys’ Fees: Normative Analysis and Pragmatic Concerns, 42 BAYLOR L.
REV. 737, 747 (1990) (explaining that many courts authorize the recovery of
attorneys’ fees and court costs for punitive purposes).
254. See Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of N.C. Rep.
Jonathan Jordan, Sponsor, May 14, 2015); see also supra notes 141, 144, and
accompanying text.
255. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion II), 194 F.3d 505,
524 (4th Cir. 1999).
256. Id. Even at the trial court level, the jury refused to award punitive
damages against the undercover reporters; its initial multimillion-dollar award
was directed against the network and its producers only. Id. at 511.
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In light of this, it is rather peculiar that the North Carolina
legislature chose to defend its bill as a mere codification of Food
Lion.257 Quite unlike the outcome in Food Lion, North Carolina’s
ag-gag law authorizes extensive punitive damages. 258 In this way,
the North Carolina statute is more accurately characterized as a
codification of the jury award in the earlier case of Food Lion I—
which, bear in mind, the trial court subsequently remitted, and the
appellate court reversed entirely.259 As one commentator noted, the
size of the initial $5.5-million punitive damage award in Food Lion
suggests the jury “may to some degree have unconsciously factored
the publication effects into the punitive damage award,” even
though it was supposed to exclude publication damages from the
compensatory damage award.260 Even where courts explicitly
instruct juries to separate damages caused by newsgathering
activities from damages caused by publication, “there is still a risk
that the jury will conflate the two and award excessive
compensatory or punitive damages.” 261 This risk is equally
prevalent in the damages provision of the current civil ag-gag
statutes.262
Awarding publication damages against protected speech is
clearly contrary to established First Amendment principles. 263
Opponents of the North Carolina ag-gag bill expressed similar
concerns regarding the bill’s damages provisions. 264 One North
257. See Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of N.C. Rep.
Jonathan Jordan, Sponsor, May 14, 2015); see also supra notes 141, 144, and
accompanying text.
258. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(d)(4).
259. Food Lion II, 194 F.3d at 524.
260. Andrew B. Sims, Food for the Lions: Excessive Damages for
Newsgathering Torts and the Limitations of Current First Amendment
Doctrines, 78 B.U. L. REV. 507, 512 (1998); see also Floyd Abrams, “Food Lion”
Endangers Muckrakers, NAT’L L.J. A15 (Feb. 17, 1997) (expressing view that
constitutional principles are “plainly implicated” in any punitive damages
award of the magnitude observed at the trial court level in Food Lion, and that
the 4000-to-1 ratio of punitive-to-actual damages is “facially inconsistent” with
the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore);
Sims, supra, at 548 (explaining that, even where punitive damages are not so
excessive as to offend due process under BMW v. Gore, “they may still be of such
a magnitude as to burden First Amendment rights.”).
261. Sims, supra note 260, at 544. Sims suggests that “jurors often
circumvent common law and constitutional limitations on publication torts
when they award reputational damages against the media for newsgathering
torts. This can occur because newsgathering torts and publication torts may be
difficult to segregate conceptually.” Id. This phenomenon is precisely what
North Carolina livestock companies and their political sympathizers are hoping
for.
262. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(d); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113(e) (2017).
263. See Sims, supra note 260, at 562 (noting First Amendment protections
would be “directly undermined” if publication damages were recoverable for
predicate torts).
264. See, e.g., Debate During Second Reading of H.B. 405 in the Senate, 2015
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Carolina senator opposed the legislation on the ground that it
created an opportunity for employers to recover “outrageously
excessive” punitive damages and attorneys’ fees for relatively minor
torts.265
As one author noted, “[T]he significant First Amendment issue
regarding newsgathering torts is not that of media liability, but
rather, of excessive damages.”266 To ameliorate this constitutional
concern while still offering employers protection from the most selfserving forms of disloyal employee conduct,267 that author proposed
a punitive-damages theory of immunity to be applied in cases of
newsgathering torts.268 “[P]rudence dictates that such immunity be
granted so as not to discourage media investigations that are
designed to produce substantially truthful speech on matters of
public concern.”269
Applying this punitive-damages theory of immunity to the civil
ag-gag laws of Arkansas and North Carolina would insulate
undercover activists in employment-based investigations from the
statutes’ crippling $5000-per-day damages provision.270 The
practical effect would be to ameliorate the laws’ constitutional
defects and bring their causal premise more in line with both policy
and logic.

C. Principles Limiting Recovery Under Ag-Gag Statutes
Multiple layers of legal doctrine insulate undercover
investigators from liability for the reputational harm that befalls
the targets of their exposés. First Amendment free-speech
protections and the concept of proximate causation are “the
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015) (statement of N.C. Sen. Floyd McKissick,
Jr., May 18, 2015) (expressing concerns over the opportunity for excessive
damages).
265. Id.
266. Sims, supra note 260, at 562.
267. See supra text accompanying note 252 (describing duty-of-loyalty
breaches for which punitive damages were deemed appropriate, such as
traditional theft or misappropriation of employer trade secrets).
268. Sims, supra note 260, at 560.
269. Id. Sims continues as follows:
[T]he strong societal interest in investigatory journalism and its
frequent production of substantially truthful publications on matters of
significant public concern . . . can be accommodated by recognizing a
limited and conditional First Amendment immunity for the media from
punitive and excessive compensatory damages for newsgathering torts,
broadly analogous to the damage limitation model created in
constitutionalized defamation under the rule of Gertz v. Robert Welch.
Id. at 562.
270. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(d)(4) (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118113(e)(4) (2017).
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principal issues” relevant to limiting damages.271 The district and
appellate court decisions in Food Lion nicely illustrate these
constitutional, logical, and policy-based principles, limiting civil
recovery for both common-law and statutory causes of action.
In Food Lion, the district court determined that the alleged
reputational harms (lost sales, loss of consumer goodwill, decreased
stock value) suffered by Food Lion “were the direct result of
diminished consumer confidence in the store[,]” and that “it was
[Food Lion’s] food handling practices themselves—not the method
by which they were recorded or published—which caused the loss of
consumer confidence.”272 The court therefore concluded that Food
Lion’s lost sales and loss of goodwill were not proximately caused by
the undercover ABC reporters’ tortious conduct (e.g., fraud and
trespass).273 The fact that those torts enabled access to nonpublic
areas of the store—where the reporters could film Food Lion
workers, equipment, and events from a perspective unavailable to
the ordinary shopper—was irrelevant to the court’s causation
analysis.274 Food Lion appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
albeit on different grounds.275 The appellate court chose not to reach
the matter of proximate cause because the issue of publication
damages could be resolved by applying settled First Amendment
principles.276
1. First Amendment
The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed a “profound national
commitment” to maintaining free and open debate on matters of
public concern.277 It is devoted to the principle that “debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.”278 To
avoid chilling political discourse, the Court in New York Times Co.

271. Nathan Siegel, Publication Damages in Newsgathering Cases, 19
COMM. LAW., Summer 2001, at 11, 16.
272. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion I), 964 F. Supp.
956, 963 (M.D.N.C. 1997), aff’d on other grounds, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that the reporters’ filming of plaintiff’s employees mishandling food
did not cause or set in motion those unsanitary practices, nor were Food Lion’s
losses “the probable consequence” of the reporters’ fraud and trespass).
273. Id.
274. Id. (holding that even if defendants foresaw, or could have foreseen, the
ultimate consequences of ABC’s intended broadcast, Food Lion’s own
unsanitary practices had “interrupted any causal connection” that otherwise
existed between the reporters’ trespass, thereby “render[ing] that tortious
activity remote from the ultimate loss of profits and sales.”).
275. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion II), 194 F.3d 505,
522 (4th Cir. 1999).
276. Id.
277. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
278. Id.

690

The John Marshall Law Review

[50:649

v. Sullivan279 established a heightened standard of proof in
defamation cases brought by public figures. 280 In order to prevail
under the New York Times standard, a defamation plaintiff must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s
statement was made with “actual malice”—an exceedingly high
burden.281 Even where the plaintiff is not a public official, proof of
actual malice is often prerequisite to the recovery of punitive
damages.282 And in any event, the plaintiff always must prove the
defendant’s statement was in fact false.283
Many lawsuits brought by targets of undercover exposés can
be characterized as attempts to settle the score for the reputational
harm they experienced in the wake of the publication. 284 These
“victims” desire the vindication of a defamation lawsuit without the
burden of proving falsity or malice.285 In Food Lion, for instance, the
plaintiff “attempted to avoid the First Amendment limitations on
defamation claims by seeking publication damages under nonreputational tort claims, while holding to the normal state law proof
standards for these torts.”286 This desire is understandable; the
resentment that naturally follows from the realization that one has
been duped tends to instill an insatiable urge for a reckoning. 287
Yet the approach attempted by Food Lion is strictly disallowed
by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.288
Hustler confirms that a plaintiff seeking damages for speech
covered by the First Amendment must satisfy the proof standard of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.289 Notwithstanding the nature of
the defendant’s underlying act (i.e., tortious or not), the Hustler
279. Id.
280. Id. at 270, 279–80, 285–86.
281. Id.; Chen & Marceau, supra note 18, at 1449. “Actual malice” is
characterized by a defendant’s knowledge of the statement’s falsity, or at least
his reckless disregard for its accuracy. Id.
282. See, e.g., Stewart v. Nation-Wide Check Corp., 182 S.E.2d 410, 416
(N.C. 1971) (denying plaintiff’s request for punitive damages without proof of
actual malice).
283. Renwick v. News & Observer Pub. Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 410 (N.C. 1984);
see also Griffin v. Holden, 636 S.E.2d 298, 302 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining
that plaintiff has the burden of proving the defendant’s statements about her
are false).
284. Sims, supra note 260, at 521. See also Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion II), 194 F.3d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 1999). As in Food
Lion, such lawsuits commonly sound in contract or tort rather than defamation,
because the truth of the broadcast is often not at issue. Id.
285. Food Lion II, 194 F.3d at 522.
286. Id.
287. See Sims, supra note 260, at 521 (characterizing lawsuits for
newsgathering torts as an effort by the plaintiff to “settle accounts” for damage
to its reputation).
288. See Food Lion II, 194 F.3d at 522 (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)).
289. Id.
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Court held that satisfying New York Times v. Sullivan is “a
prerequisite to the recovery of publication damages.” 290 For this
reason, the Fourth Circuit in Food Lion denied the plaintiff’s
request for publication damages, rebuffing its attempt to bypass the
high New York Times actual-malice standard.291
Permitting recovery of publication damages for newsgathering
torts such as fraud or trespass has been criticized by some scholars
as a “target-protective viewpoint.”292 By referring reputational
damages back to the underlying non-reputational torts, a court or
jury unconstitutionally inflates compensatory damages and/or
punitive damages, thus chilling protected speech. 293 It is precisely
for this reason that First Amendment scholars have advocated for
a punitive-damages immunity theory insulating plaintiffs from this
target-protective approach to damage assessment.294
Substantially truthful speech of public concern—the usual endproduct of media undercover investigations—should not have to seek
protection in the theoretical back-waters of doctrines specifically
designed to protect defamatory speech. It would be more effective,
logical, and jurisprudentially sound for speech that is both
substantially truthful and of public concern to find shelter under the
high-tier protection afforded by the [First Amendment].295

In line with this reasoning, free-speech protections may
operate alongside policy considerations to shield the employmentbased undercover investigator from damages for breaching her duty
of loyalty to the target employer.296 The First Amendment
principles set forth in Pickering support the view that “traditional
290. Id. at 522 (citing Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56). The Supreme Court called
this result “necessary” in order to give protected expression adequate breathing
room. Id. at 524.
291. Id. at 522.
292. See Sims, supra note 260, at 516, 522 (describing this target-protective
approach and the seminal case implementing it, Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449
F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971)); Chen & Marceau, supra note 18, at 1502 n.353
(explaining that the target-protective approach in Dietemann has been “rightly
and roundly criticized” in the forty years since it came down); Jacqueline A. Egr,
Closing the Back Door on Damages: Extending the Actual Malice Standard to
Publication-Related Damages Resulting from Newsgathering Torts, 49 U. KAN.
L. REV. 693, 712–13 (2001) (claiming the Dietemann court erred by relying
solely on the common law without considering First Amendment principles);
Nathan Siegel, Publication Damages in Newsgathering Cases, 19 COMM. LAW.,
Summer 2001, at 11, 16 (explaining that Dietemann was decided without
considering proximate causation and before much of the First Amendment
jurisprudence on publication damages was developed).
293. Sims, supra note 260, at 522.
294. Id. at 557.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 559 (arguing that the First Amendment requires publicationbased claims to be treated as separate from newsgathering-based claims in
order to avoid the effect of inflated compensatory and punitive damages that
arise from the target-protective, conflated approach).
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concepts as to loyalty and obedience may have to yield to permit
employees to fulfill their role as citizens” and allow them to
participate in public discourse on matters of widespread concern.297
As Blumberg himself admitted, “Participation in public controversy
involving the employer through the exercise of free speech presents
the most appealing case for extension of employee rights” beyond
the shackles of a generic duty of loyalty.298
Dissemination of truthful information is especially protected
when related to matters of public concern; the public’s interest in
“free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance” is a
core value of the First Amendment.299 Indeed, “state action to
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy
constitutional standards.”300 But proponents of ag-gag legislation
are attempting to do just that, claiming privacy and property rights
trump free speech on matters of public concern. 301 This claim is
baseless. When balanced against the interest in disclosing matters
of public importance, privacy concerns have repeatedly given
way.302 “The right of privacy does not prohibit any publication of [a]
matter which is of public or general interest.” 303 As the Supreme
Court noted in Bartnicki, “One of the costs associated with
participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy.” 304
Inarguably, a business offering goods or services to the public has
chosen to participate in “public affairs” and must accept the
attendant scrutiny as a cost of doing business.

297. Blumberg, supra note 149, at 303 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968)).
298. Id. at 311. But does permitting an employee this leeway allow her to
engage in “economic warfare” against her employer under the pretext of free
speech? Id.
299. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968); see also Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 401 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (explaining “state
action to abridge freedom of the press is barred by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments where the discussion concerns matters in the public domain.”).
300. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979).
301. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1208 (D.
Utah 2017); Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1202
(D. Idaho 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018); Hearings on
H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of N.C. Rep. Chuck McGrady, Sponsor, Apr.
21, 2015) (claiming, “Truthful information doesn’t trump property rights. I
mean that’s a constitutional piece.”).
302. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001).
303. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 214 (1890).
304. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534.
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a. The First Constitutional Blow to Ag-Gag: Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Otter
In August 2015, a decision came down in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Idaho marking the first successful
constitutional challenge to a state’s ag-gag law.305 The court in
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter 306 struck down the ag-gag
provisions of an Idaho statute on the ground that those provisions
violated the First Amendment right to free speech. 307 Under the
Idaho law, an employee could be convicted for recording animal
abuse or worker safety violations at an agricultural facility “without
first obtaining the owner’s permission.” 308
This notion of unconsented recording is at the heart of the
North Carolina and Arkansas ag-gag statutes as well.309 The
problem with requiring consent, as North Carolina ag-gag
adversary Senator Stein recognized, is that no employer would ever
consent to an employee’s request to film his company’s unethical or
illegal practices.310 “I assure you,” Senator Stein remarked, “that
under no person's contract of employment does it say you're
authorized to film violations of law. So, by definition, if you do these
things, you have exceeded your authority and you’re in violation of
[this bill].”311

305. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195. In July 2017, the ag-gag regime was dealt
a second blow with the publishing of the Herbert decision. Herbert, 263 F. Supp.
3d 1193. In that ruling, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah struck
down that state’s ag-gag statute on similar grounds. Id.
306. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202.
307. The district court struck down the challenged portions of the statute in
their entirety. Id. at 1212 (granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on
all claims). On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part,
upholding the district court’s determinations with regard to audiovisual
recording and entrance by misrepresentation, but finding the statute’s
prohibitions on lying to obtain records or employment to be constitutionally
permissible. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL
280905 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018). The appellate court’s affirmance on the issue of
unconsented recording is particularly damning for North Carolina’s and
Arkansas’s ag-gag legislation, since those states rely exclusively on recording
prohibitions to effectuate their anti-whistleblower purpose. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§99A-2(b)(2)(2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113(c) (2017); Wasden, 2018 WL
280905, at *15 (“Idaho is singling out for suppression one mode of speech—audio
and video recordings of agricultural operations—to keep controversy and
suspect practices out of the public eye.”).
308. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1201.
309. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(b)(2) (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118113(c)(2) (2017).
310. Debate During Second Reading of H.B. 405 in the Senate, 2015 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015) (statement of N.C. Sen. Josh Stein, May 18,
2015).
311. Id.

694

The John Marshall Law Review

[50:649

Moreover, covert photography and video recording is “a
common form of politically salient speech.”312 Members of the North
Carolina General Assembly who opposed the state’s ag-gag bill
expressed a similar view.313 During debate on H.B. 405, North
Carolina Representative Michaux urged a ‘nay’ vote on the basis
that investigative reporting has been an important mechanism for
keeping North Carolina businesses in check and preventing
companies from “prey[ing] on the public.” 314 He called the work of
investigative reporters “necessary” in order to provide the public
with crucial knowledge.315 Nevertheless, his plea was drowned out
by the bill sponsors’ rhetoric surrounding the need to “safeguard
business property” and protect against “internal data breaches” by
“bad actors who seek employment with the intent to engage in
corporate espionage or act as an undercover investigator.”316
These claims are familiar. The State of Idaho defended its aggag law by claiming it was “not designed to suppress speech critical
of certain agricultural operations but instead [was] intended to
protect private property and the privacy of agricultural facility
owners.”317 Yet U.S. District Court Judge Winmill rejected this
proffered justification, noting, “[A]n agricultural facility’s
operations that affect food and worker safety are not exclusively a
private matter. Food and worker safety are matters of public
concern.”318 Judge Winmill further noted that laws against
trespass, theft, defamation, and fraud already exist—laws that

312. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1201; Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert,
263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1208 (D. Utah 2017) (holding, “[T]he act of recording is
protectable First Amendment speech.”).
313. Debate on Motion to Override Governor’s Veto of H.B. 405 in the House,
2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015) (statement of N.C. Rep. Henry
Michaux, Jr., June 3, 2015).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of N.C. Rep. John
Szoka, Sponsor, Apr. 21, 2015); Debate on Motion to Override Governor’s Veto of
H.B. 405 in the House, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015) (statement of
N.C. Rep. John Szoka, Sponsor, June 3, 2015).
317. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202 (emphasis added); cf. Herbert, 263 F.
Supp. 3d at 1211 (noting that while “portions of the State[ of Utah]’s briefing
refer loosely to privacy and property interests, . . . at oral argument the State
explicitly disclaimed reliance on privacy or property interests” for purposes of
establishing a compelling government interest).
318. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202; cf. Animal Legal Defense Fund v.
Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905, at *11, *13 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018)
(noting government has a legitimate interest in protecting against harm to an
agricultural production facility’s sensitive and confidential information but not
protecting against the nominal harm inflicted by entry through
misrepresentation; in other words, unlike the district court, the court of appeals
drew a distinction between the privacy and property interests imbued in a
company’s commercially sensitive documents versus its physical premises).
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“serve the property and privacy interests the State professes to
protect . . . but without infringing on free speech rights.” 319
b. Content-Based and Viewpoint-Based Speech Restrictions
In striking down Idaho’s recording prohibition as
unconstitutional, Judge Winmill noted, “[T]he act of audiovisual
recording is a purely expressive activity ‘entitled to full First
Amendment Protection.’”320 Constitutional protection is at its
highest when laws limiting such expressive activity attempt do so
on the basis of content.321 To determine whether a law is contentbased or content-neutral, courts look to the purpose or motive
behind the law.322 Government regulation of expressive activity is
typically content-neutral if it is “justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech.”323 With respect to the Idaho aggag statute, its purpose as revealed in the legislative history was
“striking.”324 Likewise in Utah, whose ag-gag law was struck down
in 2017, the court in that case found the sponsors’ true purpose for
the legislation to be crystal clear (despite the state’s desperate
attempt to proffer ex post facto rationales in litigation).325
319. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202; accord. Wasden, 2018 WL 280905, at
*15 (affirming Otter in holding statute’s recording prohibition is “not narrowly
tailored” to achieve its purported purpose of protecting property and privacy
rights, since “agricultural production facility owners can vindicate their rights
through tort laws against theft of trade secrets and invasion of privacy”—laws
which burden “little or no speech.”).
320. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1205 (citing Anderson v. City of Hermosa
Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2010); accord. Wasden, 2018 WL
280905, at *13 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952)
(“Audiovisual recordings are protected by the First Amendment as recognized
‘organ[s] of public opinion’ and as a ‘significant medium for the communication
of ideas.’”). Moreover, the district and appellate courts acknowledged the
particular political importance of this type of expressive activity: “Audio and
visual evidence is a uniquely persuasive means of conveying a message, and it
can vindicate an undercover investigator or whistleblower who is otherwise
disbelieved or ignored.” Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202, aff’d in relevant part sub
nom. Wasden, 2018 WL 280905, at *13; cf. Debate on Motion to Override
Governor’s Veto of H.B. 405 in the House, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C.
2015) (statement of N.C. Rep. Grier Martin, June 3, 2015) (urging other
members of the North Carolina House to vote ‘no’ on the ag-gag bill, citing
concerns about denying whistleblowers the opportunity to document evidence
corroborating their oral testimony).
321. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994).
322. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001).
323. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Turner
Broadcasting System, 512 U.S. at 642–43 (“As a general rule, laws that by their
terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the
ideas or views expressed are content based.”).
324. Animal Law Podcast #3, supra note 119 (interviewing animal attorney
and constitutional law scholar Justin Marceau).
325. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1211–13
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To be sure, the legislative histories for Idaho’s and Utah’s laws
are rife with “smoking gun” statements by the bills’ sponsors. 326
These candid statements included one by an Idaho legislator who
explained the need to stop animal-rights activists from releasing
the undercover footage to the Internet and calling for boycotts.327
The president the Idaho Dairymen even went on record explaining
that dairy farmers needed the law in order to keep animal activists
from “stand[ing] up on a soapbox”—the soapbox being the classic
metaphor for political speech.328 This explicit legislative history
made it very hard for the state to defend the law by claiming it had
nothing to do with speech.329 Similarly, in Utah’s legislative
chambers, sponsors of that state’s ag-gag law boldly proclaimed the
need to prevent “vegetarian people” from “hiding cameras” in their
effort “to kill the animal industry.”330
As a result, the cases against Idaho and Utah were relatively
easy ones.331 The tougher cases will be against ag-gag laws enacted
in silence, without treasure troves of legislative history betraying
legislators’ unconstitutional motives. 332 Nevertheless, while ag-gag
proponents may have gotten a little wiser in the wake of the Idaho
and Utah district court decisions, even the cautiously mum
legislature bespeaks a content-based motive when viewed in the
context of previous efforts.333
As further evidence of the state’s content-based motive in
Idaho, the district court in Otter pointed to the Idaho legislature’s
decision to include a restitution provision in its statute.334 This
(D. Utah 2017).
326. Chen & Marceau, supra note 18, at 1470–71 (discussing legislative
history of Idaho ag-gag law); Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1212 (noting legislative
history of Utah ag-gag law was “rife with discussion” of sponsors’ intent to
prevent “vegetarian people” from putting Utah meat producers out of business).
327. Chen & Marceau, supra note 18, at 1470–71.
328. Id. at 1470; Animal Law Podcast #3, supra note 119 (interviewing
constitutional law scholar Justin Marceau).
329. Animal Law Podcast #3, supra note 119.
330. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1198.
331. Animal Law Podcast #3, supra note 119 (calling the legislative history
a “treasure trove” for the plaintiffs challenging the law as content-based).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1206 (D.
Idaho 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018). Judge Winmill
explained:
[T]he only loss that a victim is likely to suffer from any
misrepresentation or unauthorized image captured at a facility is the
loss of profits generated by public outcry from the conduct depicted in an
unfavorable video. The imposition of such a harsh penalty for speech
critical of an agricultural production facility evinces an intent to
suppress such speech.
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provision created a civil remedy for the aggrieved agricultural
facility owner.335 The North Carolina and Arkansas statutes,
creating civil causes of action against disloyal employees who
surreptitiously record, are analogous to the restitution provision of
Idaho’s ag-gag statute and, as such, further evince a content-based
motive behind these civil ag-gag laws.336
Content-based restrictions on speech face a “strict scrutiny”
standard of juridical review.337 To pass this highest standard, the
law must serve a “compelling state interest” and be “narrowly
tailored” to that interest.338 The purposes underlying Idaho’s and
Utah’s ag-gag statutes did not serve a compelling government
interest, “because compelling interests need to serve the public
good.”339 Ag-gag laws merely protect private industry from public
scrutiny, an interest that is far from “compelling” under the
constitutional standard.340
Having established that Idaho’s and Utah’s prohibitions on
unauthorized recording regulated content-based speech, the district
court judges in both cases next considered whether the law passed

Id. On appeal, however, the 9th Circuit chose to interpret the statute’s civildamages provision more narrowly, noting that Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell
prohibits recovery for such reputational or publication damages. Wasden, 2018
WL 280905, at *12 (citing 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988)). The appellate court explained
only restitution for “economic loss” is allowed and reasoned “reputational
damages would not be considered an ‘economic loss’” since “Idaho case law
defines ‘economic loss’ as ‘tangible out-of-pocket loss’” and “excludes ‘less
tangible damage’ such as emotional distress.” Id. (quoting State v. Straub, 153
Idaho 882, 888 (2013)). Yet the appeals court seemingly fails to recognize that
a producer who experiences “reputational harm” might try to quantify it as
“economic loss” (e.g., ensuing lost sales, discontinued contracts, PR damage
control, litigation costs, etc.); see, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
(Food Lion I), 964 F. Supp. 956, 962 (M.D.N.C. 1997), aff’d on other grounds,
194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing plaintiff’s attempt to characterize the
lost profits, lost sales, and other losses it experienced in the wake of an
undercover exposé as “publication damages”); Gilles, supra note 132 (defining
“publication damages” to include financial losses such as lost profits, diminished
stock value, etc.). Thus, a court faced with such claims may find Judge Winmill’s
analysis more instructive, though the 9th Circuit’s take on the Idaho statute
leads to the same conclusion: Restitution for such losses is simply not allowed.
335. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1206; IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(4) (2014)
(mandating restitution “in an amount equal to twice the value of the damage
resulting from the violation”).
336. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1206 (explaining, “if a favorable video of an
agricultural facility’s operations is published, a ‘victim’ under the statute will
not incur any losses,” and therefore will have no claim against the employee for
unconsented recording); but see supra note 334 and accompanying text
(describing 9th Circuit’s narrower reading of restitution provision and its
disagreement with Otter court on that basis).
337. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994).
338. Id.
339. Animal Law Podcast #3, supra note 119 (quoting Justin Marceau).
340. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1207.
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strict scrutiny.341 To pass this test, “[t]here must be some pressing
public necessity, some essential value that has to be preserved; and
even then the law must restrict as little speech as possible to serve
the goal.”342 The State of Idaho claimed an interest in protecting the
privacy and property of agricultural facilities, but the federal
district court held the statute was “not narrowly drawn to serve
those interests,” even if they were “compelling” in the First
Amendment sense (a position the court likewise rejected). 343
Compare this holding with the assertion of North Carolina ag-gag
sponsor Representative McGrady: “[T]ruthful information doesn’t
trump property rights.”344 A federal judge has stated exactly the
contrary, calling a state’s interest in protecting private property an
“important” one but “not compelling” in the First Amendment
sense.345
Moreover, like Idaho, North Carolina and Arkansas already
have ample civil and criminal laws to protect the interests of their
businesses without impinging on free-speech rights.346 The federal
district court in Otter took this as a nefarious sign. 347 Its reasoning
similarly undermines the stated intent of the civil ag-gag laws:
It is already illegal to steal documents or to trespass on private
property. In addition, laws against fraud and defamation already
exist to protect against false statements made to injure or malign [a
business]. Because the State has “various other laws at its disposal
that would allow it to achieve its stated interests while burdening
little or no speech,” it has not shown any need to have a special
statute . . . . [T]he State fails to explain why already existing laws
against trespass, conversion, and fraud do not already serve [the

341. Id.; Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193,
1211–13 (D. Utah 2017).
342. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1207 (citing Turner Broadcasting System, 512
U.S. at 680) (emphasis in original). See also Chen & Marceau, supra note 18, at
1498 (describing state interest in protecting businesses’ proprietary
information). “[T]he state has a legitimate interest in helping businesses protect
trade secrets and other proprietary information that allows them to fairly
compete in the economic marketplace.” Id. But conduct designed to expose or
misappropriate a company’s trade secrets is “clearly covered by more specific
available legal remedies,” and therefore the government’s interest in restricting
such conduct is already satisfied by alternatives less restrictive than laws that
ban undercover investigations outright. Id.
343. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1208.
344. Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of N.C. Rep. Chuck
McGrady, Sponsor, Apr. 21, 2015).
345. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1207 (rejecting the State’s attempt to ensure
the property interests of agricultural production facilities supersede all other
interests). “Given the public’s interest in the safety of the food supply, worker
safety, and the humane treatment of animals, it would contravene strong First
Amendment values to say the State has a compelling interest in affording these
heavily regulated facilities extra production from public scrutiny.” Id.
346. Id. at 1208.
347. Id. at 1210.
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purpose of protecting private property]. The existence of these laws
“necessarily casts considerable doubt upon the proposition that [the
statute] could have rationally been intended to prevent those very
same abuses.”348

Admittedly, the North Carolina and Arkansas statutes, since
they apply to all businesses, not just agriculture, may be
appropriate with respect to a limited category of businesses that do
not have a direct effect on public health or safety. 349 But even with
their wide breadth, these statutes are still clearly content-based.350
It shows how far legislators will go to protect the ag industry;
lawmakers in these states drew in these other industries just to
make it look like their laws were not content-based.351 No judge
should let him- or herself be fooled by this thinly veiled attempt to
avoid strict-scrutiny review.
At bottom, undercover investigations “advance core First
Amendment values by exposing misconduct to the public eye and
facilitating dialogue on issues of considerable public interest.” 352
Damages resulting from this type of “politically salient speech” are
insulated from recovery by First Amendment protections. 353 In
addition to these constitutional protections, public policy
considerations and principles of logic also operate to limit damage
awards for tortious newsgathering activity.
2. Proximate Causation
In order to recover monetary damages for its loss, the plaintiff
in a civil action must show a proximate connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s harm.” 354 Black’s Law
348. Id. at 1208, 1210 (quoting Comite de Jornaleros v. City of Redondo
Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 949 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) and U.S. Dept. of Agriculture
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1973)); see also Chen & Marceau, supra note
18, at 1485. “[M]ost lies that result in the exposure of unsavory or illegal
industry practices but do not compromise intellectual property or trade secrets
will be protected insofar as they are not made with the intent or reckless
disregard of the risk of exposing trade secrets or similarly protectable interests.”
Id. Upton Sinclair, for instance, “may have gained access to things that the
slaughterhouse owner wished he had not seen, but he did not expose (nor did
he intend or care to expose) any properly protected intellectual property.” Id. at
1485–86.
349. Then again, any business that caters to a public audience ought to have
reduced privacy rights. See supra note 304 (explaining the cost of participation
in public affairs is a diminished expectation of privacy).
350. Animal Law Podcast #3, supra note 119.
351. Id.
352. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1204 (D.
Idaho 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018).
353. Id.; Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
354. Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities
Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 830 (2009).
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Dictionary defines proximate cause as “[a] cause that is legally
sufficient to result in liability; an act or omission that is considered
in law to result in a consequence, so that liability can be imposed on
the actor.”355 Proximate cause is an elastic concept designed to
achieve justice on a case-by-case basis.356 At its core, proximate
cause serves a liability-limiting function inextricably linked to both
logic and policy, operating to shield investigators from liability for
truth-disseminating conduct.357
In the context of an undercover investigation, allowing
recovery of damages for reputational harm against an investigator
is best characterized as forcing the causal train to jump its tracks.
Recognizing this, the district court in Food Lion disallowed
compensatory damages for the lost profits and diminished
consumer confidence Food Lion experienced in the wake of ABC’s
exposé, reasoning that such damages were not the proximate result
of the defendants’ tortious acts.358 Proximate causation is a slippery,
abstract concept, and courts routinely struggle with how to apply it
in tort actions of all sorts (though it is most often discussed in the
context of negligence).359
In spite of its difficulties, proximate cause nevertheless
performs an important line-drawing function in the assignment of
liability.360 As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, “The term
‘proximate cause’ is shorthand for a concept: Injuries have countless
causes, and not all should give rise to legal liability.”361 In other
words, we must draw the line somewhere, beyond which it would
simply be unfair or irrational to impose liability. Thus, both policy
and logic play a role in this liability-limiting analysis.
In determining whether a defendant’s conduct amounts to the
proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injury, courts taking a policy-based

355. Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
356. Andrew L. Merritt, A Consistent Model of Loss Causation in Securities
Fraud Litigation: Suiting the Remedy to the Wrong, 66 TEX. L. REV. 469, 495
(1988).
357. See, e.g., Sperino, supra note 359, at 1202 (explaining “proximate cause
inherently relates to policy” in that it serves a politically motivated “liabilitylimiting” function).
358. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion I), 964 F. Supp.
956, 962–63 (M.D.N.C. 1997), aff’d on other grounds, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir.
1999).
359. See Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1199, 1200, 1206 (2013) (styling proximate causation “a notoriously
flexible and theoretically inconsistent concept” applied primarily to determine
liability for negligent acts); cf. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390 (U.S. 2014) (“The proximate-cause inquiry is not easy
to define, and over the years it has taken various forms; but courts have a great
deal of experience applying it, and there is a wealth of precedent for them to
draw upon in doing so.”).
360. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2637 (U.S. 2011).
361. Id.
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approach apply principles of fairness and justice to determine the
extent of a defendant’s liability.362 Some scholars have commented
that such an approach “is not about causation at all but rather
involves an analysis of the policy considerations affecting the scope
of the defendant’s legal responsibility for the plaintiff’s injury.” 363
In this way, proximate causation provides a mechanism for
implementing public policy judgments in which the wrongfulness of
a defendant’s conduct is weighed against the severity of the
plaintiff’s harm to determine whether society should provide
judicial redress.364 Wrongfulness is measured in part by looking at
the defendant’s purpose behind his illegal act (i.e., whether
conducted in pursuit of commercial profit versus pursuit of the
public interest).365 Based on these factors, legal responsibility is
limited “upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.”366
Other jurists have espoused a more linear/analytical approach
to proximate causation.367 Considerations include whether there is
“some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious
conduct alleged,” or whether the injuries are “too remote, purely
contingent, or indirect.”368 Along these same lines, whether a cause
is considered “proximate” may be analyzed in terms of its relevancy
to the particular harm: “[T]he plaintiff must ‘show that the element
that makes the conduct wrongful or creates the undue risk was
relevant to the harmful outcome for which the law provides a
remedy.’”369 The Restatement (Third) of Torts incorporates this
362. See Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101, 106 (5th Cir. 1973) (analyzing
proximate cause in terms of “whether the principles of logic, fairness, and
justice dictate the defendant should be held liable in a given situation”).
363. Fisch, supra note 354, at 831 n.119 (2009); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.,
162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between
“logic” and “practical politics” in resolving questions of proximate cause).
364. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 482 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1975); Sperino, supra note 359, at 1204 n.18 (adding as a factor “the
concern that the extent of liability not be wholly out of proportion to the degree
of wrongfulness”); see also Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 222 A.2d 513, 517 (N.J.
1966) (basing proximate cause determination on “mixed considerations of logic,
common sense, justice, policy and precedent”).
365. Sperino, supra note 359, at 1204, n.18.
366. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 41, 264 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis added).
367. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2645–46 (U.S. 2011)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Sperino, supra note 359, at 1203–04 (citing Chief
Justice Roberts’s dissent in CSX Transp. to illustrate this logic-based
approach).
368. CSX Transp., 131 S. Ct. at 2645–46 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 838 (1996)); accord. Sperino,
supra note 359, at 1204–05; see, e.g., Chen & Marceau, supra note 18, at 1502
(applying this linear approach, stating, “[H]arms borne of publication on issues
of public concern, and the concomitant public discourse that results, are harms
that cannot fairly be traced to the lie that created the opportunity for the
exposure.”).
369. Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities
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approach, at least in the context of physical-injury torts; it limits an
actor’s liability to “those harms that result from the risks that made
the actor’s conduct tortious.”370 This approach essentially counts the
links in the causal chain to determine the relevancy of the
defendant’s conduct and the rationality of imposing liability.
Proximate causation has also been explained in terms of an
act’s necessity and sufficiency in bringing about a particular harm:
“The determination of legal causation depends in part on whether
an initial event is necessary, sufficient, or both, in the causing of a
second event.”371 As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan once
explained:
[O]rdinary principles of causation used throughout the law of torts
recognize that ‘but for’ causation . . . is never a sufficient condition of
liability. . . . [T]he causes of an event go back to the dawn of human
events, and beyond . . . . As a practical matter, legal responsibility
must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with
the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing
liability.372

This necessary-sufficient framework may be applied to limit an
undercover investigator’s liability for the target company’s
pecuniary losses. While trespass or fraud may in some cases be the
only means of accessing nonpublic areas of a facility in order to
gather damning evidence in the first place, these antics do not
themselves cause the target any actual harm.373 Gaining access and
surreptitiously filming company misconduct is not itself sufficient
to generate public scorn against the company. 374 There are at least
three essential intermediate steps: publication of the evidence,

Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 831 (2009) (quoting Tony Honoré, Necessary and
Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law, in PHIL. FOUND. OF TORT L. 363, 368 (David
G. Owen ed., 1995) and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (2010)).
370. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
(2010).
371. Kaimipono David Wenger, Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery
Reparations Debate, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 279, 287 (2006); see also Sperino, supra
note 359, at 1201–02 (“At common law, causation often embraces two different
kinds of issues: cause in fact and legal or proximate cause. . . . [F]actual cause
is a necessary, but not a sufficient basis for imposing liability on a defendant
for harm. In these cases, courts impose a requirement of legal cause, also called
proximate cause.”).
372. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 833 n.9 (1985) (citing W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (5th ed.
1984)).
373. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion I), 964 F.
Supp. 956, 962–63 (M.D.N.C. 1997), aff’d on other grounds, 194 F.3d 505 (4th
Cir. 1999) (holding trespass and fraud by undercover reporters did not
proximately cause lost sales or diminished consumer confidence in target
company).
374. Id.
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digestion of this evidence by consumers, and a subsequent decision
to take their business elsewhere.375 In this sense, newsgathering
torts are a necessary but insufficient cause of the exposed company’s
lost sales and profits.376 In other words, the undercover
investigation is not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s loss.377
Some commentators have balked at the notion of courts
applying proximate-causation principles to limit liability in
statutory causes of action.378 Yet even those authors recognize that
proximate cause serves a valid and important role in limiting
liability for certain statutory causes of action, particularly those
that expressly codify common-law principles.379 When construing
the language or scope of a statute, courts may “presume that
statutes are adopted against a background of common law.”380 In
any case, these more conservative commentators caution courts to
consider “whether the statute they are interpreting is enough like
common law torts that use proximate cause.”381
In passing North Carolina’s ag-gag law, the state legislature
expressly sought to codify the common-law analysis applied in Food
Lion.382 However, it conveniently ignored the court’s attitude
toward punitive damages and publication (compensatory)
damages.383 As one of the bill’s sponsors explained, the law “puts
teeth into North Carolina trespass law by providing a [$]5,000 per
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. See Sperino, supra note 359, at 1247 (arguing courts should be loath to
read proximate cause into the elements of a statutory cause of action without
considering the statute’s interaction with the common law).
379. Id. at 1214–15. The Supreme Court itself has increasingly applied
proximate causation to statutes. Id. at 1216; see, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390 (U.S. 2014)
(unanimously holding that a plaintiff attempting to sue under the Lanham Act
must show defendant’s deceptive advertising proximately caused plaintiff’s
economic or reputational injury); Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
342–46 (2005) (requiring proximate cause for securities-fraud claims); Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 703–04 (2004) (analyzing proximate causation
in the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot.
Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267–68 (1992) (stating proximate cause is necessary to
recover under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
Act); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687,
713 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (applying proximate causation to
Endangered Species Act analysis).
380. Sperino, supra note 359, at 1215. “To properly apply tort concepts to a
statute, the courts should convincingly invoke one or more of the accepted
reasons for doing so . . .” (for instance, evidence of legislative intent, evolving
social understandings, or “pragmatic considerations”). Id.
381. Id. at 1234.
382. See Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of N.C. Rep.
Jonathan Jordan, Sponsor, May 14, 2015); see also supra text accompanying
note 141.
383. See supra notes 272–276 and accompanying text.
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day penalty for [a] violation . . . .”384 This provision violates the
spirit of the Food Lion holding by allowing a judge or jury to
inordinately punish an undercover investigator who collects and
truthfully reports information about employer wrongdoing and to
unconstitutionally compensate the plaintiff for reputational harm
caused by its own unethical practices.385
Although the district and appellate courts in Food Lion relied
on very distinct approaches denying the plaintiff’s claim for
publication damages, application of either rationale insulated the
reporters and the network from liability for the losses Food Lion
sustained as a result of diminished consumer confidence following
the PrimeTime Live broadcast.386 All told, Food Lion turned out
extremely well for undercover investigators and reporters and much
less so for employers. It is curious, then, that the North Carolina
legislature would want to codify that case as a protective measure
for businesses.387 But a closer look at the bill’s language explains
this peculiarity: By including the $5000-per-day exemplarydamages provision in an attempt to put “teeth” into the Food Lion
holding,388 the bill drafters departed significantly from the court’s
analysis, violating principles of free speech, fairness, and logic as a
result.

IV. PROPOSAL
Ag-gag statutes that authorize civil restitution for reputational
harm violate the concept of proximate causation and are
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 389 Moreover, to the
extent ag-gag laws authorize punitive damages and attorneys’ fees

384. See Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of N.C. Rep. John
Szoka, Sponsor, May 14, 2015).
385. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion I), 964 F. Supp.
956, 962–63 (M.D.N.C. 1997), aff’d on other grounds, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir.
1999) (refusing to allow the jury to include lost profits, lost sales, diminished
stock value, “or anything of that nature” in its calculation of compensatory
damages, having determined that the defendants’ unconsented recording and
broadcast was not the proximate cause of the company’s pecuniary losses); Food
Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion II), 194 F.3d 505, 522 (4th Cir.
1999) (rebuffing Food Lion’s attempt to recover publication damages for nonreputational torts “without satisfying the stricter (First Amendment) standards
of a defamation claim”).
386. Food Lion I, 964 F. Supp. at 966; Food Lion II, 194 F.3d at 524.
387. See Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of N.C. Rep.
Jonathan Jordan, Sponsor, May 14, 2015); see also supra notes 141, 144, 147
and accompanying text (discussing bill sponsors’ stated intent to codify the
common-law principles set forth in Food Lion).
388. See Hearings on H.B. 405, supra note 80 (statement of N.C. Rep. John
Szoka, Sponsor, May 14, 2015).
389. See supra Part III–C (describing how free-speech and proximatecausation principles apply to limit recovery against undercover whistleblowers).
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against undercover investigators, these provisions similarly operate
to suppress political speech and will not pass strict scrutiny.390 In
this section, I call upon litigators and lawmakers to tackle the
unconstitutional civil-damage provisions found in nearly half of the
ag-gag statutes in this country.391 I provide several constitutional
and policy-based arguments in favor of overturning these laws,
drawing analogies to recent court opinions. 392 I also illustrate how
the liability-limiting function of proximate causation precludes
recovery against undercover investigators who expose illegal or
unethical business practices.393 I then point out various practical
considerations that ought to dissuade companies from seeking
restitution against undercover investigators. 394 Finally, I encourage
the continued evolution of free-speech and agency principles to
facilitate the outing of employer wrongdoing in order to protect the
well-being of animals, workers, and the general public.
A company that experiences decreased profits and diminished
consumer confidence in the wake of a truthful exposé may not
recover compensatory damages for these losses. Such recovery is
barred under the speech-protective “actual malice” standard
(promulgated by the Supreme Court in Sullivan and Hustler and
applied by the Fourth Circuit in Food Lion).395 Ag-gag provisions
authorizing punitive or exemplary damages are likewise prohibited
by the First Amendment, insofar as these damages punish
protected speech.396
When a law regulating expressive activity is justified with
reference to the content of the restricted speech, it must withstand
strict scrutiny in order to pass constitutional muster.397 Applying
390. See generally supra notes 337–345 and accompanying text.
391. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113(e) (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(d)
(2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1828(a) (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-104(1)
(2015); IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(4) (2014).
392. See infra notes 395–404 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 356–381 (describing various approaches to proximate
causation and the doctrine’s liability-limiting function); see also infra notes
411–412 and accompanying text.
394. See infra notes 413–418 and accompanying text.
395. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion II), 194 F.3d
505, 522 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56
(1988)); see also supra notes 288–291 and accompanying text (explaining why
current Supreme Court precedent disallows publication damages for truthful
reporting).
396. See Stewart v. Nation-Wide Check Corp., 182 S.E.2d 410, 416 (N.C.
1971); Sims, supra note 260, at 522; see also supra text accompanying note 282.
397. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642–643 (1994) (“As a general
rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech
on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based.”); Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1206 (D. Idaho 2015), aff’d in
relevant part sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018
WL 280905, at *13 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018) (citing Berger v. City of Seattle, 569
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this well-settled principle to North Carolina’s ag-gag law, one can
see it is justified with reference, albeit indirect, to the content and
viewpoint of the regulated speech: An expressive act (i.e., recording
or photography) on an employer’s premises, if disseminated, is
illegal under the North Carolina statute only if it depicts the
employer in a negative light.398 To record and disseminate such
footage would be “disloyal,” whereas a surreptitiously recorded
video that praises the employer would be perfectly in line with the
employee’s duty of loyalty.399 The distinction rests in the tenor of
the publication.
Arkansas’s analogous statute is likewise impermissibly based
on content, despite its slightly more adroit wording: Recording on
an employer’s premises is illegal under the Arkansas law only if it
is subsequently used to damage the employer.400 As written, the law
invariably targets only those recordings whose content is damaging
to the employer; secret recordings that are ultimately beneficial or
inconsequential to the employer are not illegal. This is a contentbased distinction that does not pass constitutional muster.
The natural (and intended) effect of creating a statutory cause
of action against whistleblowing employees is to censor speech
critical of the employer.401 Civil-recovery provisions in ag-gag
statutes effectuate this censorship to protect the animal-agriculture
industry.402 But protecting private industry from public scrutiny is

F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)) (“[A] law can be content based if the
underlying purpose of the law is to suppress particular ideas.”).
398. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(b)(1)-(2) (2015). Unauthorized recording on an
employer’s premises is a violation of the Property Protection Act if the employee
uses that recording for a disloyal purpose; recording for any other reason, even
if unauthorized, does not run afoul of the Act. Id. This amounts to a contentbased restriction on expressive activity.
399. Finding a similar distinction in Idaho’s ag-gag statute, the federal court
in Otter struck down Idaho’s law as an unconstitutional content-based and
viewpoint-based restriction on speech. 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1211, aff’d in relevant
part sub nom. Wasden, 2018 WL 280905, at *13. Under the Idaho law, an
undercover reporter who secretly recorded at an agricultural operation would
not violate the statute if her purpose was to publish a laudatory piece about the
company, whereas a reporter who exposed illegal or inhumane behavior by the
company would be liable under the statute. Id. The operative distinction was
the message the reporter wished to convey. Id. Likewise, in North Carolina, a
hidden-camera recording that portrays the employer in a positive light would
not amount to a breach of her duty of loyalty, whereas publication of a recording
critical of the employer would be a breach.
400. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113 (2017).
401. Governor’s Veto Message, H.B. 405, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015)
(May 29, 2015), http://ncleg.net/Sessions/2015/h405Veto/letter.pdf.
402. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113(e); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(d); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 47-1828(a) (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-104(1) (2015); IDAHO
CODE § 18-7042(4) (2014); see also supra note 123 and accompanying text
(comparing and contrasting the civil-recovery provisions in these states’ ag-gag
statutes).
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simply not a compelling state interest.403 Therefore, such civilrecovery provisions cannot pass strict scrutiny and are
unconstitutional.404 For this reason, legislatures ought to repeal
those statutes already enacted,405 or courts must strike them down
as unconstitutional infringements on free speech. In the meantime,
courts tasked with applying these civil-recovery provisions against
undercover investigators must respect the First Amendment
principles that limit the amount and type of damages a jury may
award.
In addition to these robust First Amendment protections, the
concept of proximate causation further shields undercover
investigators from the (potentially massive) losses a company may
sustain as a result of public scorn for its exposed misconduct.406
From a policy perspective, mild deception or disloyalty utilized in
the course of an undercover investigation does not warrant
compensatory damages in the thousands or millions. This is
especially clear upon examination of evolving agency-law
principles.407 The clear trend in the law of agency has been toward
a relaxation of employee loyalty standards in light of other policy
considerations—namely, public safety and morals.408 Courts should
apply these relaxed loyalty standards when assessing claims for
damages against undercover investigators under ag-gag statutes.
In the interest of public policy, courts must reject the notion that
industry interests rank above consumer safety and animal
welfare.409 By refusing to award publication damages and
exemplary damages against investigators, courts can eviscerate the
dangerous effect of these civil ag-gag provisions.

403. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1207 (D.
Idaho 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Wasden, No. 15-35960, 2018 WL 280905 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018); see also supra
text accompanying note 345.
404. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1208; see also supra text accompanying note
343 (explaining that a state’s interest in protecting the privacy and property of
its agricultural facilities is not compelling, and, even if it were, ag-gag statutes
such as Idaho’s are “not narrowly drawn to serve those interests”).
405. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
406. See supra Part III–C–2.
407. See generally supra notes 148–167 and accompanying text (describing
the evolution of agency law and policy).
408. Id.
409. Given the elasticity of concepts like “fairness” and “justice,” it is
conceivable that a court applying a policy-based approach to proximate
causation in a conservative, pro-agriculture state would feel justified ordering
retribution against an undercover investigator whose documentation exposes a
producer to public scorn and commercial loss. However, even the most industryfriendly judge is bound by First Amendment protections. In this way, the
constitutional principles described above insulate the undercover investigator
with greater certainty than a policy-based approach to proximate causation.
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Even the most industry-friendly judge must reach this
conclusion, as he is bound by principles of logic.410 No matter how
despicable a court might find an undercover activist’s fraudulent or
disloyal conduct, it cannot impose liability where the alleged causal
connection between the tort and the loss is illogical. Reputational
harm suffered by a company in the wake of an undercover exposé is
purely contingent on the reaction of the consuming public and
ultimately stems from the company’s own unsavory conduct, not the
investigation that exposed it.411 This logic-based approach to
proximate causation has recently gained favor with the U.S.
Supreme Court.412 Thus, I beseech even those judges who abhor
sneakiness or deceit to reject animal-agriculture plaintiffs’ requests
for damages, if only for the sake of preserving principles of logic—a
cornerstone of American jurisprudence.
Animal-agriculture companies themselves would do well to
step back and consider the ramifications of bringing a civil claim
against a whistleblowing employee. Ag-gag supporters promote
these statutes as a means of reducing negative publicity
surrounding their industries.413 Assuming an activist group goes
ahead and releases an investigation in spite of these laws, the
company that reacts with a lawsuit would only expound the
negative publicity triggered by the content of the exposé itself. 414
This outcome is inevitable due to the public’s (and media’s)
pervasive concern with corporate social responsibility.415 A
company exposed for its wrongdoing who then tries to sue its
exposers will not sit well with truth-seeking Americans, and the
media is quick to condemn such behavior as well.416 Furthermore,
410. See supra notes 367–370 and accompanying text (describing linear
approach to proximate cause).
411. See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Food Lion I), 964
F. Supp. 956, 962–63 (M.D.N.C. 1997), aff’d on other grounds, 194 F.3d 505 (4th
Cir. 1999) (explaining plaintiff’s lost sales and diminished consumer good will
were the result of its own unsanitary food-handling practices, not of the torts
defendants had committed to expose those practices).
412. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377,
1390 (U.S. 2014).
413. See, e.g., Chen & Marceau, supra note 18, at 1470–71; supra notes 328,
330 and accompanying text (describing ag-gag supporters’ desire to shield their
industry from shameful videos and criticisms).
414. See Blumberg, supra note 149, at 312; see also supra notes 193–196 and
accompanying text (describing how an employer’s ability to seek redress against
a whistleblowing employee is limited as a practical matter).
415. Id.
416. See, e.g., Justin Jouvenal, Virginia woman is sued over her Yelp review,
WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2012), www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/2012/1
2/04/1cdfa582-3978-11e2-a263-f0ebffed2f15_story.html (reporting that lawsuits
against online reviewers have met with little success and often backfire,
generating significant additional negative publicity for the business plaintiffs);
accord. Justin Parkinson, The Perils of the Streisand Effect, BBC NEWS
MAGAZINE (July 31, 2014), www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28562156 (describing
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animal-agriculture companies’ hypocrisy and doublespeak is
already blatant: For instance, arguing in favor of ag-gag laws,
industry spokesmen claim the hidden-camera footage published by
animal activists is staged or dramatized, while in the very next
breath they justify the depicted practices as “standard” and
“necessary.”417 This glaring inconsistency aside, the industry’s
attempt to justify such conduct based on its widespread use is
fallible reasoning, and consumers are already exasperated by the
self-serving rhetoric.418 For these reasons, companies’ attempts to
sue undercover investigators under ag-gag laws are bound to meet
further distain.
In sum, groups representing interests such as animal welfare,
worker’s rights, and civil liberties should rise up to challenge the

the phenomenon whereby an attempt to censor a piece of information results in
the information spreading more widely); Jessica Chasmar, Galaxy S4 Owner
Claims Samsung Tried to Silence Him After Phone Caught Fire, WASHINGTON
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013) (describing how media outlets quickly picked up the story
of a Canadian man who was bullied by cellphone manufacturer Samsung in an
attempt to censor his negative comments on YouTube); Milo Yiannopoulos,
What is ‘The Streisand Effect’?, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 31, 2009), http://blogs.tel
egraph.co.uk/technology/miloyiannopoulos/8248311/What_is_The_Streisand_E
ffect (describing how the Church of Scientology’s unsuccessful attempts to
censor Tom Cruise’s “indoctrination video” sent the video viral).
417. Rick Barrett, Georgia Pabst & Lee Bergquist, Farmers Say Some
Actions Depicted in Video May Not Be Animal Abuse, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL
(Dec. 11, 2013), www.jsonline.com/business/farmers-say-some-actions-depictedin-video-may-not-be-animal-abuse-b99162000z1-235497631.html;
Ag-Gag
Debate, supra note 11.
418. Amanda Radke, Consumer Perceptions Will Determine Agricultural
Practices, BEEF MAGAZINE (Aug. 14, 2012), http://beefmagazine.com/blog/cons
umer-perceptions-will-determine-agricultural-practices (warning farmers and
ranchers that “agriculture has to do a better job of simply answering consumer
questions” and avoid talking about “the economics of standard methods”).
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constitutionality and political soundness of these ag-gag laws in
court.419 In the meantime, legislators in ag-gag states must
419. A coalition of animal-rights and consumer-protection organizations
have begun doing just that. As noted above, the plaintiffs in Otter and Herbert
took a hard swing at the ag-gag laws of Idaho and Utah. Complaint, Animal
Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-cv-00104 (D. Idaho Mar. 17, 2014);
Complaint, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-00679-RJS (D.
Utah July 22, 2013). Notably, the Idaho plaintiffs placed particular focus on the
invidious restitution provisions in that state’s statute. Complaint, Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-cv-00104 (D. Idaho Mar. 17, 2014). Plaintiffs in
both cases achieved resounding success at the district court level. See supra
notes 305–308, 317–325 and accompanying text.
In 2016, numerous members of the same coalition of plaintiffs that
challenged the laws in Idaho and Utah also filed a constitutional challenge to
North Carolina’s Property Protection Act, the ag-gag law discussed at length in
this Comment. Complaint, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Cooper, No. 1:16-cv-00025 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2016). On May 2, 2017, the
district court dismissed that suit on standing grounds, calling it “purely
speculative” whether a surreptitiously surveilled North Carolina business
would ever invoke the law against any of the plaintiffs. People for Ethical
Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 378 (M.D.N.C. 2017).
On that basis, the judge determined the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a
sufficiently imminent threat of injury to satisfy Article III standing
requirements. Id. at 386.
The crux of the district court’s dismissal relied on a perceived distinction
between pre-enforcement challenges to civil versus criminal statutes. Id. at
376–84. In essence, the court reasoned that, because the Property Protection
Act authorizes a private cause of action as opposed to a state criminal
prosecution, it is less reasonable to expect the statute will ever be used. Id. at
383 (explaining “it would be unreasonable to assume the legislature enacted [a
criminal] law without intending that it be enforced by the State,” but where, as
here, “the State is not tasked with enforcement of the Act” because it is civil in
nature, the same level of threat is not present). This reasoning is farcical. The
enactment and enforcement of a civil cause of action falls squarely to the
government, and many state entities may sue under the Act just like private
corporations. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-3 (2017) (granting the University
of North Carolina the power to sue, to “take, demand, receive, and possess all
moneys,” and to otherwise act as a corporate entity); id. § 90-85.4 (same, with
respect to the North Carolina Pharmaceutical Ass’n); id. § 143B-1258 (same,
with respect to state Veterans Recreation Authorities). It would be just as
unreasonable to assume the legislature enacted a civil cause of action without
intending that it be used by the state as it would be to assume the same with
regard to a criminal statute. Id. In other words, it is as reasonable for an
undercover activist to assume a public entity he surreptitiously surveils and
subsequently exposes would bring an action against him in a civil ag-gag state
as it is to assume that a prosecutor would bring a criminal action against him
in a criminal ag-gag state. The imminent threat of state-sanctioned harm is the
same, if not greater, in the context of a civil ag-gag statute.
The North Carolina court thus erred in finding that the plaintiffs – at least
one of whom stated it would like to conduct an undercover investigation of a
University of North Carolina animal research laboratory – did not have
standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge. People for Ethical Treatment of
Animals, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 373, 384 (M.D.N.C. 2017); see First
Amended Complaint, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v.
Cooper, No. 1:16-cv-00025, 9–10 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2016) (explaining PETA
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promptly make efforts to repeal these statutes, and lawmakers in
other states are strongly cautioned against enacting this type of
anti-whistleblower legislation in their own states.

V.

CONCLUSION

Animals, workers, and conscientious consumers rely almost
exclusively on undercover investigations to expose the widespread
exploitation and abuse taking place behind closed doors. These
investigations have revealed egregious animal cruelty, unsafe
working conditions, and severe food-safety violations, leading to
meaningful institutional change.420 So-called ag-gag laws aim to
shutter the only window we have into one of the country’s most
powerful and abusive industries: animal agriculture. Publicinterest litigators and free-thinking lawmakers must work on their
respective fronts to rid our system of these unconstitutional,
unenlightened laws.
In the meantime, courts applying these laws against
undercover investigators are limited in terms of the damages they
may authorize. Constitutional, political, and common-sense
principles disallow recovery for reputational harm sustained by the
animal-agriculture company in the wake of a truthful exposé.
Exemplary damages are likewise prohibited as speech-suppressive
state action. In light of these limitations, restitution provisions in
ag-gag statutes authorizing recovery of such damages are
unconstitutional and unenforceable, and must be struck down to
avoid chilling the socially important work of undercover
whistleblowers.

would like to conduct another undercover investigation of the animal research
facilities at UNC–Chapel Hill but fears liability under the Property Protection
Act and has thus decided not to engage in its chosen form of speech).
It could also be argued that the legislature’s act of voting a civil ag-gag
statute into law is itself an unconstitutional state action due to its chilling effect
on would-be whistleblowers’ protected speech. But even if we accept that is not
the case—i.e., if we accept that the plaintiffs in People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals, Inc. v. Stein lacked standing due to the pre-enforcement nature of
their challenge—ultimately any court order for damages authorized under the
statute would inarguably amount to unconstitutional state action, for the
reasons discussed throughout this Comment. So, one way or another, use of civil
ag-gag laws will ultimately invoke sufficient state involvement to give activists
standing to challenge their constitutionality. The question, then, is whether
states wish to draw attention to the businesses within their borders as activists
ramp up undercover exposés of those businesses in an attempt to “draw the
foul,” so to speak, to challenge the legislation from a defensive posture once they
have been sued under it.
420. See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text (describing in detail the
successful outcomes of undercover investigations).
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